Management in Government

November 1982 Volume 37 Number 4

Management in Government

incorporating

Management Services in Government

Produced by the Management and Personnel Office in collaboration with Her Majesty's Treasury and other departments and published quarterly by Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Editorial Board:

N E A Moore *(Chairman – Civil Service College, Management and Personnel Office)*
J E Pestell *(HM Treasury)*
Mrs M B Sloman *(Management and Personnel Office)*
A W Russell *(Management and Personnel Office)*
J Stubbs *(Management and Personnel Office)*
R Gapp *(Editor – Management and Personnel Office)*

Views expressed in this journal are essentially those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect official policy.

©Crown copyright 1982
First published 1982

ISBN 0 11 726746 5
ISSN 0263-4678

Front Cover: In Liverpool after the riots
(photograph reproduced by kind permission of *Liverpool Daily Post and Echo*).

Management in Government
November 1982 Volume 37 Number 4

Contents

Page

206 Urban Renewal: The Financial Institutions and Whitehall
T R Hornsby

219 Management Guidelines
R J Calder

224 Economic and Financial Factors Affecting Public Expenditure
M Spackman

233 A New Printing Works for Hansard
W A Frost

241 The Review of R&D Support Services
A Payne

250 Reform and Clout
N Machiavelli

251 Managing a Government Department
S D Walker

260 Equal Opportunities for Women
The Rt Hon. Baroness Young

268 Policy Management: Some Reflections on a Pilgrimage
K Batterham

275 Civil Service College Courses and Seminars

276 New Publications on the Civil Service

277 Index for 1982

Urban Renewal: The Financial Institutions and Whitehall

T R Hornsby

Timothy Hornsby has been an Assistant Secretary in the Inner Cities Division of the Department of the Environment for four years. He acted as Project Manager for the Financial Institutions Group exercise.

Inner city riots

The summer of last year saw a wave of riots in inner city areas which dramatically highlighted their problems. But the deep rooted nature of these had been recognised for some time. In the early 1970s Peter Walker commissioned a series of inner area studies; in 1976 Peter Shore produced a major White Paper on Inner Cities and set up partnership arrangements with the local authorities. Nevertheless, the riots gave a new focus and a new urgency to a set of problems which affected many government departments:

- declining industries
- job loss and unemployment
- housing difficulties

©Crown copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 206–218

- a major outflow of population from inner areas which included many of the more talented and energetic
- truancy and educational problems
- poor environment
- racial tension
- the collapse of community life and, ultimately, the breakdown of public order
- policing methods.

Lord Scarman in his report specifically commented on the failure of previous attempts to tackle the problem of inner city decline, the lack of an effective co-ordinated approach, and the need to involve the private sector, banks, building societies, and other business companies.

In July 1981, following the Toxteth riots, Mr Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment, went to Merseyside with a small team of Department of the Environment (DOE) and Home Office officials. In the course of his examination of the problem on the ground over a period of some three weeks, he became increasingly concerned with the problem of the 'absentee landlords', notably those major financial institutions whose actions or lack of them had significant import for inner city areas but who were not, on the whole, themselves located there. Accordingly, he invited the chairmen and chief executives of the major financial institutions – banks, building societies, pension funds and insurance companies – to join him in a bus tour of the worst areas in Liverpool. At the end of that trip, the Secretary of State asked the chairmen and chief executives not for money, but for something they had not perhaps expected – the loan of one of their best managers to come and work with the Department. This article seeks to describe how these managers in the Financial Institutions Group (FIG) worked. (A quite separate taskforce was set up on Merseyside confining itself to projects in that area.)

The birth of the Financial Institutions Group

The financial institutions responded positively, and over the next couple of months 26 managers joined from the major banks, building societies, insurance companies and pension funds.* They were faced with an

*The institutions involved were:
Banks: Barclays, Co-operative, Lloyds, Midland, National Westminster, and Williams & Glyn's;
Building societies: Abbey National, Halifax, Leeds Permanent, Leicester, Midshires, Nationwide, and Woolwich;
Insurance and life assurance companies: Commercial Union, General Accident, Guardian Royal Exchange, Norwich Union, Prudential, Royal, and Standard Life;
Pension funds: British Gas Corporation, British Petroleum, British Railways Board, British Steel (Industry), National Coal Board, and Post Office Staff Superannuation Fund.

extremely general remit: to work with central Government in developing new approaches and ideas for securing urban regeneration. The aim was to produce a practical programme, not a purely academic analysis. There was thus no intention to pile up a massive report at the end of the exercise, but instead a promise that the managers' ideas and findings would be carefully considered and implemented as the exercise progressed. The underlying thesis was that there had been a lack of private investment in, and involvement with, inner cities. There was a need, therefore, not only to convince the private sector that its own profitability depended on the well-being of the community in which it was based, but also to overcome some of the traditional suspicion and lack of co-operation between different sectors of the community.

Start-up problems: 'Will you come into the Whitehall web?'
The responsibility for the exercise was put under the wing of an existing Assistant Secretary command.

I very speedily succeeded in losing all my other inner city work to concentrate on the FIG exercise. Much of the early effort consisted in establishing contact with parent institutions and identifying a manager who could be enticed on board. Given the wide scope of the exercise, the lack of any detailed blueprint, and the difficulty of explaining either the skills required or what on earth the managers would actually be doing, this in itself was an exercise not without its fraught moments.

At an early stage, we decided that it was best that the managers should retain an office with their parent companies together with secretarial and back-up support. This was intended to enable them to keep in contact with their colleagues in their own institutions – not forgetting that in terms of staff time, overhead costs, and backup services DOE was securing about £1m worth of outside effort at no cost to the central Exchequer.

In turn, DOE provided conference/workspace and a support unit, which rapidly grew and required a further Assistant Secretary, three principals (two full-time and one part-time), a senior research officer, two administration trainees, an HEO and a CO.

The 26 managers, from all parts of England and two from Scotland, ranged in age from 29 to 67, with a disparate mix of talents and experience. We found that many of the rules of the game had to be made up as we went along. Even basic questions such as to whom would the managers actually report, and how the exercise would be structured, needed to be worked out from first principles. We flirted at an early stage with the idea of using

consultants, and indeed obtained advice from one firm on a possible organisational structure for the exercise. But it soon became apparent that the managers themselves did not welcome significant continuing involvement by consultants. Their use, however, was not ruled out at a later stage as projects were developed.

Instead we saw the way forward as being in three phases:

- learning
- identifying issues and producing suggestions, and finally
- the implementation/testing of ideas.

Climbing up the learning curve

The exercise began, therefore, with a period of intensive briefing and familiarisation of the urban problems faced in Britain and elsewhere. This phase took longer than we had initially expected. The managers were faced with a very taxing schedule, involving a plethora of background material from the DOE and other departments, visits for discussions with local authorities and a whole range of outside bodies; and the whole process was made even more difficult to manage by the fact that a sequential intake meant that some managers joined almost two months after the first one. The managers themselves were anxious to study issues in some depth, so they could make informed judgements about what they should really investigate.

By September, 14 FIG managers were on board and the first briefing course was held. By 1 October, 20 managers had been nominated and a series of informal visits and discussions – the start of very many – had begun. (Indeed, we estimated that in the course of the exercise the managers visited some 300 organisations, including commercial and industrial firms, financial and property institutions, Chambers of Commerce, voluntary organisations, local authorities, nationalised industries and so forth.) By 8 October the managers were getting together for the first group 'plenary' session which not only allowed them as a group to consider the exercise, define tasks, settle organisation and agree on visits, but also enabled them to meet and exchange with others information about existing duties, skills, knowledge, and responsibilities so as to marry these up with the issues to be considered. At that meeting, we decided on the broad format for the exercise. This included a number of sub-groups to look at various topics, each with a 'convenor' drawn from the managers, and with a DOE 'assessor' to shadow the sub-groups. Surprisingly, the managers showed much greater interest in the need to

draw up an organisation chart and to produce terms of reference than did the civil servants. But both sides set to work with a will on these two daunting issues, the results of which are below.


Informal feedback to parent institutions.
Reports to Secretary of State.
Contacts with Chairmen as necessary.
S/State discussions with FIG
FIG PLENARY
Joint DOE/FIG Chairman.
Regular meetings (not less than monthly).
Consider sub-group reports and activities.
Supported by DOE Secretarial Unit.
Requests or commissions from outside.
Use of consultants.
Sub-groups – mainly multi disciplinary, but some single discipline; cross membership. Responsible for settling own convenor. Papers to be drafted by group. DOE to provide assessor for each group to proffer advice and act as link person.
DOE Central Support Unit – Office manager to be appointed. Collates material, ensures appropriate circulation, checks diaries, provides contacts, assists where necessary with travel arrangements, maintains progress flow chart, keeps programme budget etc.

Informal guidelines for study were adopted as follows:

- to examine efforts presently being made by both the public and private sectors to regenerate the economy of inner city areas, and to consider their effectiveness;

- to identify present constraints – perceived or actual – to such efforts; the means by which they might be eased; and the scope for improved co-operation between the public and private sectors to promote urban development, including the scope for increased financing by the institutions in inner city areas;
- having regard to the need for the business community in general (and not just the financial institutions) to play a full part in the society in which they exist, to identify and develop the public and private sector measures which would encourage them to do this, particularly in inner city areas;
- to develop ideas for experiment and to make practical suggestions for effective action which take account of possible constraints on new initiatives within both the public and private sector.

Note: In working along these guidelines the group was asked to have regard in particular to:

(a) experience in other countries of public/private sector co-operation in urban development;
(b) the fact that both public and private sector policies not specifically related to urban areas may effectively inhibit urban regeneration;
(c) the need to examine the cost-effectiveness of current urban aid programmes;
(d) the particular need to examine ways in which investment in urban regeneration can be made profitable.

The organisation framework shows continuing links between the Secretary of State and FIG. From the beginning, the Secretary of State took a close personal interest in the exercise and had meetings with the FIG members frequently. He also met, from time to time, the chairmen and chief executives of the institutions involved, to inform them about the way the exercise was developing, to float ideas which had come up from FIG, and to discuss in general the evolution of institutional attitudes to inner cities.

Firming up on the work programme

After the first plenary session, five sub-groups were formed to carry out a detailed examination of the following topics:

- *Small businesses*—This group reviewed the present facilities available to small businesses, taking into account the Wilson and Bolton Committee Reports, the views of ethnic and other representative groups, the impact of larger companies, and the non-financial constraints to the development of small business.
- *Inhibitors and incentives to development*—This group looked at ways in which public and private sectors can co-operate to maximise the benefits from investment in inner cities and create a new confidence in these areas. They looked in particular at organisational and financial mechanisms for encouraging joint

ventures: land release, planning control, tourism and energy conservation.

- *Housing measures*—This group concentrated initially on three main areas: repair and improvement of the housing stock (particularly in the private sector); new forms of housing tenure (including shared ownership); and the future of difficult-to-let local authority dwellings including possibilities for privatisation; they went on to make a study of housing associations, and other housing issues.
- *Employment and training measures*—This group considered measures to increase employment in inner cities, in particular the scope for increased public and private sector capital investment; the adequacy of training programmes for future employment needs; and the scope for the development of growth industries in inner cities.
- *Area-based case studies*—From October to December a small group examined the role and effect of Inner Area Programmes, the balance of Urban Programme Expenditure, and other policy issues in the London Borough of Lambeth.

There was a pretty good mix of managers between the sub-groups, though – understandably – most of the bankers went to the small businesses sub-group, and building society members went to the housing group, because of their respective expertise. The sub-groups worked very closely together and a good understanding soon built up between the FIG 'convenors' and the DOE 'assessors' to the sub-groups, which in retrospect has been crucial to the success of the exercise.

It was interesting that the private sector managers in their initial enthusiasm showed most concern with their scrutiny of public sector practices, for example, the departmental administration of grant regimes, or what central Government could do that it was not doing (like spending more public money), or was doing which it was doing badly. As a *quid pro quo,* the civil servants on the exercise suggested that while we were delighted that our own systems be scrutinised, it would also be helpful if we could challenge the institutional assumptions and practice of the major institutions themselves. This was a point by no means without sensitivities, particularly for private sector managers aware they were returning to their companies at the end of the year. After some haggling the matter was raised by the Secretary of State direct with the parent institutions. They accepted that their managers should be free to examine institutional practice, while of course reserving the right to agree or disagree with any suggestions they made. This also solved the dilemma of to whom the managers reported: they were their own men, not binding their companies, and reporting to the Secretary of State. (Sometimes the FIG support unit acted as an intermediary!)

Carrying out the work programme

By the second plenary session on 22 October, we had outlines from the convenors for their studies including objectives and target timetables, and the managers had sorted themselves into groups according to their interests and specialities. Getting matters in focus proved a real and continuing problem. Could the assessors hold the managers back from re-inventing a device in areas where we knew there already existed round things with spokes? Could some managers move from a concern with solving the problems of the world to identifying a particular issue? Could other managers move from their particular 'nitty gritty' to an area which had more general import? How could ideas be put down and developed?

'Paperasserie'

Keeping track of the managers, ensuring that they were kept informed of the work of their colleagues, providing them with relevant material and so forth involved the support unit in a massive circulation exercise. Some of the managers considered that this justified their worst fears about the obsession of bureaucracy with paper and even threatened to ask us to provide extra filing cupboards for it.

The American experience

It was decided at an early stage that the managers would benefit not only from extensive visits in this country but also should visit the eastern seaboard of the USA to see what had been done there following the riots in the 1960s and if there were any lessons to be learnt which could be translated to the UK. The managers were divided into three groups. All went to Washington at the beginning of November shortly after the last manager joined and then split up, teams going to:

- Detroit, Boston and Atlanta
- Baltimore, Chicago and Kansas City
- Philadelphia, New York and Cincinatti

each accompanied by one member of the DOE. This in many ways was the end of the beginning: the gang plank on late comers was drawn up and the exercise really began to steam ahead. Not only did the visit provide an ideal opportunity for the managers to get to know one another and the three departmental members of the support unit, but it also provided a culture shock for which there was probably no substitute. They saw how the financial institutions, public and private sectors worked together to renovate parts of major cities, but, just as importantly, saw that there were many areas still untouched, as poor and rundown as they must have been before the riots. They could agree that whilst there were some lessons to be learnt, by no means all of the US experience was applicable here. What did

stand out was public/private sector co-operation and the phenomenon of corporate social responsibility. The trip did two things: it helped forge a sense of genuine group spirit and purpose, and it highlighted a number of practices in the USA of relevance to the UK scene.

Firming up at Ware

On return from the States the reports on ideas stemming from the visit, together with progress reports on other aspects of the work were probed and discussed in depth at a week-long seminar, which was held in seclusion at Fanhams Hall, Ware (a building society training college) at the beginning of January. It was an intensive week of work in congenial snowy surroundings but gave the opportunity to think undisturbed about what had been achieved so far, where we were going, what we could hope to achieve, and to develop work programmes and timetables. The group had a day-long session with the Secretary of State and other Ministers. The Secretary of State asked for a checklist of ideas for him to consider by the end of the week. This produced some stimulating brainstorming sessions, where ideas however trivial or unlikely to run were thrown around and hotly debated. The idea was to see what sort of suggestions the managers had and identify early runners and no hopers. The week-long seminar helped in the definition of sub-group tasks, and put them onto the right road for the second stage of the exercise. We regarded Ware as marking the end of the first stage of the exercise – that of briefing and learning.

Coming up with the goods

Meanwhile ideas were being worked up and gradually and carefully being released onto the world of Financial Institutions, private and public sectors. As a result:

- Major clearing banks are now taking initiatives to secure the promotion of business development in the inner city areas.
- There is a new Urban Development Grant modelled on the US system. Up to £70m of Government funds are to be allocated to the scheme in 1983/84 for projects which have a substantial private sector input. The objective of the scheme is to provide the necessary pump-priming from the public sector to enable the private sector to proceed now with inner city developments on a commercial basis which would not otherwise go ahead. (One spin-off of this was the involvement of a FIG team in the marketing of the grant which involved a series of regional presentations – an audio visual display, the fielding of questions, and the provision of advice.)
- The Institutions are examining the possibility of establishing *Inner City Enterprises Limited (ICE)*. This would be a service company designed to work up development schemes in the inner city areas, financed by contributions from the funding institutions.

- Various housing pilot schemes are evolving including the setting up in Birmingham of a new style Agency Housing Service based on the US Neighbourhood Housing concept. The Leeds Permanent and Halifax Building Societies have between them allocated £1m for the comprehensive internal improvement of private properties in an inner city area. Simultaneously, Birmingham City Council is providing £1.3m to carry out external repairs and improvements. The Agency Service – local authority and building society officers – is also on hand to advise on all aspects of home ownership, home improvements, mortgage and finance in general, and to help with plans and builders.
- Radical ways to tap institutional finance for housing and consider index linked mortgages are being further considered.
- Useful suggestions stemming from an examination of the Lambeth Partnership have been made about the operation of the Urban Programme.

A window on the wonderful world of Whitehall

On the whole, the FIG managers found the exercise stimulating, and in the course of it tossed both bouquets and brick-bats at the Civil Service. Some examples are below.

- 'The civil servants allocated to the exercise have given first class support . . . the responses from other departments have been patchy, to say the least . . . the Treasury seems to be living in an "ivory tower" . . . all FIG members learnt a whole new vocabulary'.
- 'A week in Marsham Street would make many businessmen realise that Government is a much more complicated business than it seems to be to the outsider . . . an immense amount of time seems to be taken up in inter-departmental discussions.'
- 'When I joined FIG I ventured to suggest to a civil servant that I was looking forward to the chance to find out how Government worked, and the response was "if you find out please let me know". I realise now that I might have set my expectations a little too high, but at least I think I have a better understanding of the so-called machine. It's good to know that the Civil Service has a human face.'
- Some civil servants were 'of a high quality and very helpful', 'sympathetic, knowledgeable, articulate and above all constructive'. Others were 'either unwilling or incapable of developing ideas', and 'had a very limited focus to their research activity'.
- 'People who a year ago knew nothing of Whitehall and cared less could be heard confidently declaiming the need for "secondary legislation on this one" . . . There is one thing worse than a Minister who won't scratch his bottom without Civil Service guidance and

that is one who imagines that the advice of an outsider with experience of the real world but not the topic under discussion is automatically worth more than that of a civil servant with years of patient study of his subject matter behind him.'

- 'Some of the younger FIG men, I judge, have grown during the year. It will be of value generally to have a number of senior managers who appreciate how Whitehall works and the constraints legal and political that inhibit change of direction/policy. The Government administration seem spongy. The various Ministries and even sections of them plough steadily along their chosen lines and there seem to be few ways of budging them . . . I actually met several civil servants who were prepared to "pop it in the post to you tonight" – and did. They were for the most part better at analysing a problem and digging out a solution than much of private industry.'

Sillinesses and strengths – the private sector on Whitehall

The overall impression which we secured was that the private sector did encounter odd rigidities and nonsenses in the Civil Service machine – the detailed accounting and form filling and rules over travel expenses; the agonies over securing a desk photocopier to back up some of the late-night demands for the FIG exercise (two months of correspondence before one was secured); the relative inflexibility of the rewards system (six months to process an application for a responsibility allowance before it was turned down); and a tendency on the part at least of some civil servants to 'have a valid objection to any possible solution', or to produce a five-page submission as a response to every one-sentence recommendation, and to have a capacity to process anything which involved other departments with inordinate delay.

Was the system one which stressed analysis over much, but left less room for making decisions and taking responsibility? On the other hand, I think the perception of the managers was that at least some of their Civil Service colleagues scored high in terms of analytical skill, hard work, and were even, on occasion, capable of progressing urgent matters with quite astonishing speed. One difficult area was the attitude to release of information to the Press. FIG managers ranged from the forthcoming to those concerned about premature publicity. DOE tried to arrange appropriate joint briefing sessions, but as one FIG manager put it, 'You do appear to jump like monkeys at the end of a string at the approach of even one insignificant journalist'.

Sillinesses and strengths – Whitehall on the private sector

Perceptions the other way round are perhaps less easy to formulate, given the less homogenous nature of the private sector managers. The civil

servants were, on the whole, impressed by the way in which FIG managers were prepared to devote very considerable effort into mining difficult seams; to using their own background expertise to good effect, and to producing, once they had got up steam, a plethora of ideas. On the other hand, at times we found the private sector managers unwilling to produce the type of articulated argument necessary to carry other departments with us, or even to present to Ministers; surprisingly, sometimes a little slow at reacting to Ministerial remits; and some of them at times disingenuous about the extent to which brilliant blue sky ideas could in fact be accepted by the governmental system. But some stuck to their guns – and others came out with pretty convincing one-liners.

The enterprise – success or failure?

Ultimately, of course, the result of the FIG exercise will be judged by its fruit: what recommendations were produced, which ones were capable of being implemented, and what effect did they have. It is too soon to judge and the judgement must in many cases come from others. So far, what can be said is that the FIG managers have succeeded in producing a wide range of ideas: some of these have been implemented, and seem likely to produce a beneficial effect.

Provided that that does indeed prove to be the case, it is perhaps unhealthy to concentrate too much on the mechanics of the exercise, working methods, and internal attitudes. On these, however, a couple of observations might not be out of place. The exercise represented a very novel departure – large numbers of private sector managers, conducting a wide-ranging review, embedded in the Whitehall system, but with links outside. It was quite unlike one conventional model where outsiders come into Whitehall to perform a specific task drawing on their personal professional expertise. However, it was not a Royal Commission type model either, where distinguished outsiders take evidence, hear views, and are supported by a Civil Service secretariat. The exercise partook a bit from both models. There were very real initial teething problems of refining the task, and setting workable objectives; and a great deal of work was required by both sides to build up effective working relationships, and to agree on the tasks and how they should be handled. Working together required a degree of honesty, and a willingness to abandon some preconceptions: and both these factors were present.

It is perhaps a comment on the compartmentalised nature of British society that both for the civil servants and the managers on the exercise this was in many cases the first time they had had an insight into the working methods, attitudes, and capabilities of each other. As one manager put it, 'It is a tribute to everyone involved that twenty-six managers and a handful of civil servants from assorted backgrounds

should have gelled together so well from the outset – I am sure many of the personal relationships that have been fostered will be maintained in the years ahead'.

What did Whitehall really do?

The civil servants on the exercise found themselves working at the frontiers of normal Civil Service duties. We briefed managers and opened doors for them. But we also had to help them develop their arguments, attempt to feed in constructive criticism, and then, when a recommendation emerged, help them fight for it, sometimes against our own colleagues. The range of issues, the spread of visits and the different nature of the managers, none of whom stood in a line relationship with us, did pose some fairly classy problems. One question that could be fairly asked would be whether a concentration of expertise in a purely Civil Service team working on this problem would have been able to have come up with the same quantity and quality of recommendations. In some areas, I think it would be fair to say that the Civil Service machine could have identified not dissimilar policy proposals. In other areas, there is no doubt that the managers themselves made a contribution which we could never have secured within Whitehall. And, quite apart from arguments about the paternity of ideas, there is no doubt that an idea strongly promoted by the FIG managers was likely to carry more clout, and to be sold more easily, to some audiences than a suggestion which had emerged and been worked on exclusively within the Whitehall cloisters.

Ovid's guide

Ovid in his *Ars Amatoria* advised young lovers to 'clean their teeth and take their time': advice as useful as many of the more detailed technical guides now available. So with management techniques: simple advice is often the best. If any other colleagues are faced with two dozen private sector managers descending on them, I can only suggest:

- try and decide what you are really meant to be doing;
- do see you get consistent and powerful Ministerial support: it helps to have a Secretary of State who is both supportive and anxious to lead from the front;
- the way to solve large problems is to break them into small pieces: go for finite issues and sub-groups rather than mammoth committes;
- it is never too soon to start identifying pay-offs, and often too early to think you can grab them;
- get past jargon-swopping into honesty as soon as possible: locking everyone up in a snowbound country house or an American hotel helps.

Management Guidelines

R J Calder

Bob Calder is a Principal in Management and Efficiency 2 Division of the Management and Personnel Office, on secondment from HM Customs and Excise. He is responsible for the *Typing* and *Transport Management Guidelines* and is currently reviewing travel.

Introduction

Management Guidelines are statements of good practice for managers of common services. They are being issued by the Management and Personnel Office (MPO) to help promote efficiency and managerial effectiveness in Government departments. The first four guidelines covering messengers, telecommunications, typing and transport were sent to departments on 15 June 1982.* Further guidelines are planned on other support activities.

Responsibility for support services is generally seen as the less glamorous side of management. Nevertheless support services are important and present managerial problems in any organisation. Their effectiveness can have a significant impact on the smooth running of the organisation but their cost is an overhead that must be kept under control. In an organisation as large as the Civil Service the total cost of support activities can be very large indeed, as the following table shows:

Activity	Estimated current costs (£m)
Typing	197
Messengers	46
Telecommunications	200
Transport	25

At the beginning of 1982 twenty-five thousand staff (including part-timers) were employed on typing and 7,000 on messenger duties. About 18,000 vehicles were being operated.

*Copies of the *Management Guidelines* can be obtained from departmental management services units. Readers outside the Civil Service and others having difficulty in obtaining copies should request them directly from Mr Calder at Management and Personnel Office (ME2 Division), Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2AZ (telephone: 01 – 273 3195 or, for the Government Telephone Network, 273 3195).

©Crown Copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 219 – 223

These are clearly activities worthy of management attention and it is nothing new for a central department to issue advice about them. Over the years, guidance and handbooks on a great many subjects of common interest to departments have been produced. What then is different about the *Management Guidelines?* This article examines four main areas of difference and describes the background to and purposes of the guidelines.

New lessons

A first and big difference is that the guidelines contain many new lessons derived from fieldwork more detailed and intensive than before. Assignment officers from MPO's Management and Efficiency divisions took part in 36 departmental studies of messenger services, 20 of telecommunications and ten each of typing and transport. The fieldwork was part of an MPO programme of across-the-Service reviews of activities common to a number of departments. The programme also includes reviews of stores, training, travel, office services organisation and control, and reprographics (most of which are already in hand).

These activities are not new subjects for review. So the approach adopted was to draw on the work already done by departments on each activity to get the background right, devise a suitable method of review, and identify common themes. MPO assignment staff then joined departments in new studies designed to bring about direct improvements in efficiency in the department in question and to test and develop initial ideas for more general application. Many of the studies were scheduled already as part of departmental management services, staff inspection or internal audit work programmes. Each study was carried out as a separate departmental exercise leading to a departmental report for negotiation and implementation in accordance with normal departmental processes. The emphasis throughout has been on a close collaboration between MPO and departmental assignment staff.

The approach has proved remarkably successful, producing benefits for both the MPO and departments. Departments have found it useful to be able to draw upon extra and informed assignment officers to help improve efficiency and reduce costs. The level of savings has been considerable, averaging 40 per cent of costs in messenger services and at least 12½ per cent in the other areas so far tackled. For the MPO the advantages have been that its staff were able quickly to increase their knowledge and skill and to identify and test lessons of broad relevance in a variety of departmental circumstances. The MPO has thus been able to bring new substance to 'central guidance' by re-thinking existing standards of performance and management practice and by developing new criteria where previously there were none. Examples are messenger workloads

which are often substantially below the 45 minutes per hour now recommended and the provision of telephones for which criteria have been introduced for the first time, including the expectation that three to four staff sharing an office will share a telephone.

The target audience

The guidelines are also intended to achieve deeper penetration and harder impact than earlier advice. They promulgate basic indicators of satisfactory performance and practice that are aimed at managers at all levels in departments with a responsibility for the services in question. In particular they are aimed at those managers directly responsible for the day-to-day running of the services. Impact depends on the guidelines being put to the uses for which they are intended. These vary according to the position of the user in the organisation.

Some managers with day-to-day responsibility for services may feel that they are on their own and be anxious to know more about similar operations elsewhere in their own and other departments. Other managers may have no previous experience of the area for which they are responsible and would welcome any informed advice. For these the guidelines provide a broader frame of reference, such as the level of typing output to be expected, against which managers can make judgments about how well they and their staff are doing. Where performance and practice fall short of the guidelines, they provide advice and targets that should enable managers to improve efficiency.

For more senior managers, who often do not become familiar with the details of all the areas for which they have a managerial responsibility, the guidelines provide criteria for performance and practice that can be used to ask basic questions about the efficiency of the operations within their command. At its simplest, the question to be asked by senior management is, 'Do our arrangements conform with the guidelines?'.

For management services, staff inspection and internal audit staff the guidelines provide basic information and pointers that save a great deal of often tedious research and 're-invention of the wheel' when first undertaking a review of one of the areas in question. Our experience suggests that review staff welcome assistance of this kind which enables them to concentrate on the fact-finding and fieldwork that comprise the real meat of their assignments.

Getting the guidelines to all these people is in itself a major undertaking. Once with them it is clearly important that the messages they contain should be pithy and succinct. Hence their design, especially the single sheet format. The intention is to provide a quick and easy reference that can be widely distributed at minimum cost. (My colleagues and I are grateful to the Central Office of Information for their design suggestions

and practical help.) For managers who would like more detailed information about each subject, *Supplementary Notes* are available on request. It is for departments to decide on the method and level of distribution that they give to the guidelines but early indications are that they share our belief in them as an aid to managers.

A developing framework

The guidelines reflect in concept and content developing ideas in the Service about the role of the manager, accountability in cost and other terms, and the relationship between the centre and departments.

It is recognised increasingly that front line managers responsible for particular services have a key role to play in improving Civil Service efficiency. Much thought is being put into how best to improve and develop their jobs by increasing the power delegated to them and by giving them greater responsibility for matters within their control. Increased authority in turn carries with it an increased accountability for the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations. To make a reality of this, front line managers need the right tools, relevant training and access to information on good performance and practice—which is what the guidelines aim to provide.

Although the guidelines are based on a wide and varied field experience they do not set out to cover every circumstance. There will be situations where divergence from the guidelines is both necessary and justified. What is important is that the manager concerned should know that he is departing from broadly tested standards, should satisfy himself that this is justifiable in his circumstances, and should be prepared to account to more senior management for the divergence.

The guidelines are also a modest expression of the developing relationship between the MPO and departments. The MPO view is that delegation, accompanied by appropriate guidance and monitoring or audit, is generally preferable to direct involvement in departmental decisions. An illustration of this shift in emphasis is given by the *Transport Management Guidelines* which delegated to departments authority to procure additional motor vehicles and those above the basic 1000 cc standard, a control that had previously been exercised by the MPO on behalf of the Treasury. Thus the MPO job here will move from direct control through case work to monitoring and auditing the standard of transport management throughout the Government service. The guideline will provide the basis for that audit.

Control of costs and financial management will also become increasingly important factors for managers, not least because of the Financial Management Initiative launched recently by the MPO and the Treasury. The guidelines ask managers to consider the use of costs as a means of

planning, monitoring and controlling the services for which they are responsible. Many departments are introducing local budgets for their managers and it may be appropriate that users should be charged, at least notionally, for the services they consume. The guidelines do not attempt to offer a prescriptive formula since the way in which cost control is best applied will vary from department to department. Rather than follow a central model it is important that cost control mechanisms should be compatible with other departmental financial systems. They should not only provide means of control at local level but also be capable of aggregation to show the cost of departmental operations as a whole, for example, in support of the scrutiny of departmental running costs. The development of such systems is as yet at an early stage in many departments, but it is not too soon for managers to be aware of the costs of the services they control and to give thought to how best these costs can be brought to the attention of users.

Follow up

Unlike earlier published advice, the issue of the guidelines is not seen as an end in itself. The MPO will contact departments towards the end of the year to follow up the use that departments have made of the guidelines. This is expected to be a two-way process. The MPO wishes to know whether the guidelines have in fact got into the hands of those front line managers with a responsibility for the services in question and whether this has resulted, or is beginning to result, in improvements in performance. Departments in turn will have the opportunity to report their experience in applying the guidelines, to discuss problems that may have arisen, and to suggest changes that appear to be necessary.

So the guidelines in their present form are not seen as the last word. They will be refined and developed in the light of the practical experience of departments in applying them. Copies have been sent to the Trade Unions, whose comments will be taken into account. The objective is to evolve and apply standards of performance and management practice that compare with the best outside the Service.

Economic and Financial Factors Affecting Public Expenditure

M J Spackman

This is the edited text of a talk to Health Service treasurers at a seminar on the Public Expenditure Survey 1982 held in April 1982 by the Department of Health and Social Security. Michael Spackman is the Senior Economic Adviser in charge of the Public Services Economic Division in the Expenditure Support Group of the Treasury.

Time allows far less contact than we would like with those who are close to the final expenditure of public money, which the Treasury usually sees in numbers of at the very least tens of millions and very often billions or tens of billions. It is therefore a special pleasure to be here, where despite the difference in view that we inevitably have from time to time with the Health Departments, health is a programme where debate has over the years been particularly constructive and shows good signs of remaining so.

I propose to talk first about the *national* economic factors bearing upon public expenditure in general over the next several years. I shall then say a little about the change in the Public Expenditure Survey to cash planning, and conclude with a few words on the Treasury's broad approach to efficiency.

The state of the economy

Through much of this talk I shall be looking not so much at this year or last,

©Crown Copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 224–232

but at developments over a much longer timespan. It is only by doing this that we can understand current economic policies, and see the underlying realities.

Looking back over 20 years or so, we can see many deep seated trends in the economy which were not all recognised as such at the time. The best known of these long-run trends are those of inflation and unemployment. Inflation in the UK can now be seen to have accelerated from the late 1950s, reaching more than 20 per cent in the mid-1970s. In parallel with this has been a long-term increase in unemployment. Indeed throughout the 1960s and 1970s every successive Government experienced on average, during its term of office, both higher inflation and higher unemployment than its predecessor.

Not so long ago, the response to high unemployment was for the Government of the day to reflate the economy by increasing public expenditure or reducing taxation, so that demand would increase, companies would have more orders, and the numbers of jobs and people's income would grow.

But one lesson of the 1960s and early 1970s, now widely accepted by economists (even though they differ in their policy prescriptions), is that reflation in these simple terms no longer works. It may create jobs in the short run, but inflation then accelerates and everything has to be severely wound back.

In the 1960s the most striking consequence of this inflation was on the balance of payments, leading on occasion to the trauma of devaluation. Since 1972 the exchange rate has been floating and in some ways the consequences can now be more dramatic. Instead of a balance of payments problem we can have an exchange rate crisis, and this could follow just from the prospect of an inflationary policy, if the foreign exchange markets saw it as such; and we can also get dramatically high and accelerating inflation as happened, for example, far more so in the UK than in other industrial countries, after the oil price shock of 1973–74.

It was the experience of the mid-1970s in particular – you will recall the IMF crisis – which has led UK Governments to give much more weight, at the national level, to money and cash expenditures, as opposed to focussing (as in the past) upon real output and employment; inflation has been seen, as it were, as a separate and often subsidiary problem.

Thus it was in 1977, long before the present Government took office, that targets were introduced for the total national money supply. And it was a year earlier in 1976 that cash limits were introduced into public expenditure. This emphasis on money and cash expenditure has since developed further, with commentators also putting weight on total money expenditure on the economy; and with the important change in the Public Expenditure Survey from planning in volume to planning in cash.

Managing the economy in money terms shows up straight away the costs, as well as the benefits for the economy as a whole, of increasing Government spending or cutting taxes. It creates an environment in which the national money supply and hence money expenditure are constrained. Any extra spending in one area can therefore be achieved only by cutting spending elsewhere, or by prices being held below those expected when the target was set. More money spent on health means less spent on something else, either on other public services, or on other public or private sector output.

Monetary targets help to portray the underlying reality that we cannot simply *spend* ourselves into a high-employment, stable-inflation economy. There are economists who argue, responsibly, that we might be able to spend more if we took parallel, separate measures to contain inflation – with suggestions ranging through new ideas for income policies, to the proposal, more complex, but still concerned ultimately with the constraint of prices, of a period of general trade protection. But I personally find it hard to see any credible set of macro-economic policies which, without an eventual return to accelerating inflation, could create substantially more expenditure than the general policies now being pursued.

But enough for the moment of inflation and general unemployment. These are not the only problems. Looking again over 20 years and more, the UK has achieved less productivity growth, and therefore less income growth, than other industrialised nations. Productivity growth has consistently fallen behind the OECD average, by about one per cent per year, so that we have fallen in the international league table of income per head, from about the OECD average in the early 1950s, to only three-quarters of the average by the end of the 1970s. On top of this, world economic growth as a whole has been slower in the past decade than before, so that our absolute rate of growth has declined as well.

There have also been less well known but in some ways more disturbing trends. For example over the past 20 years the number of job vacancies averaged over each given cycle has stayed almost constant. The level of unemployment for a given level of vacancies has therefore risen. This means that, for several possible reasons, people and jobs are coming together less efficiently than they used to do.

Yet again, there has been a very serious fall in company profitability, from around eight per cent in real terms in the 1960s, to a mere two or three per cent during the 1970s.

Thus in parallel with the emphasis on monetary totals to contain inflation, there is a second, necessary dimension of national economic policy. This comprises measures to increase the detailed working—the so-called 'supply side'—of the economy, for example by measures to help

increase labour skills and mobility, and more generally by developing an economic environment in which new skills and technology in industry will thrive and the economy grow.

It is at all these underlying trends and needs in the economy to which we must look, if we, and you, are to judge what economic policies are feasible or likely in the years ahead. At this moment, in 1982, although seasonally adjusted unemployment is still slowly increasing, many other features are improving. Output, productivity and profitability are all rising. But we cannot assume that the underlying trends will quickly come right.

The pressure on public expenditure

Now what does all this mean for public expenditure and in particular public expenditure on health? I start from the position that there is no case for straightforward reflation, and I first consider the implications of looking at, and managing, the economy mainly in money terms, together with the issue of supply side efficiency. I will then look more closely at the competition between different public expenditure programmes.

In the absence of a policy of traditional reflation, total money expenditure in the economy is broadly fixed in advance. A key question then is how much of the total spending should be by Government and how much should be by private individuals or companies.

This is in part a question of political preference. Some people like the idea of collective services, funded by general taxation. Others dislike it. The long-term trend of opinion here, and in the Western world as a whole, is perhaps for increasing personal choice, with an increasing perception of taxation as a burden.

But there is no doubt about the impact of public service expenditure on the rest of the economy. Money collected by taxation, or by contributions such as National Insurance, or by borrowing, and spent by Government, is money which is no longer available for private purchasers to spend as they choose on marketed outputs.

It is very largely to protect companies from the effects of higher Government borrowing – that is from even higher interest rates – or from the effects of even higher taxation, and to allow companies to develop and expand, and to bring non-inflationary economic growth, that public expenditure is being contained as tightly as it is.

One reason for preferring expenditure on and by companies is that it is companies which have suffered most in the recession. It is not I think generally realised that, over the two years to mid-1981, total output and employment in the public services actually showed little change. At the same time output in the private sector fell sharply, and employment there fell by almost 1½ million.

But a more fundamental reason is that it is mainly to companies that we must look for economic growth, which must come over the longer term, from productivity growth. Health expenditure, besides bringing direct benefits to individuals, does contribute to some degree to growth. It achieves its own productivity growth, although this is hard to measure, but of course this productivity growth should *reduce* the resources needed to provide a given level of services. Health expenditure also contributes to the health of the labour force. But it is to economic activities which offer scope for continuing major productivity growth that we must look, if we are to create the resources which we want for any substantial increase over time in health expenditure. These activities are for the most part in the marketed sector of the economy.

There are other factors, also to do with improving supply side efficiency, which put further pressures on public service expenditure, and perhaps on health expenditure in particular. One is another aspect of taxation, which besides diverting resources from the rest of the economy affects incentives and generally distorts prices in ways which further reduce economic efficiency. Another is the direct cost of any Government measures to improve the working of the economy, for example on training, which adds to the competition for public sector funds. And this competition is increased, in public debate, by supply side efficiency being often called in aid of other public expenditure programmes, such as roads and some nationalised industry borrowing, but not so much on health (although, of course, health expenditure has a lot of public support, for other reasons).

The distribution of public expenditure between programmes

I said that I would look more closely at the competition between different public expenditure programmes. To do this it is again instructive to look over a long period of time.

Every area of public expenditure – roads, prisons, public transport, regional assistance and so on – has its powerful advocates, but let us look at two of the biggest programmes.

First, expenditure on social security, which has for over 30 years grown at a much faster rate than the economy as a whole. This expenditure is money transferred from taxpayers to pensioners and others to spend as they choose, and is not a use of resources by government. But it does add to the burden of taxation, to the point where now more than ten per cent of national income is transferred in this way. Further growth may be less rapid over the next decade than in the past (because of the temporarily low birth rate in the 1920s which determines the numbers now approaching retirement). But social security will continue to pre-empt an increasing amount of taxable capacity, whether as tax revenue, or as specific social security contributions.

The growing trend of social security has long been with us and is quite widely recognised. Less widely perceived perhaps is the changing scale of demand of defence. Throughout most of the 1950s, the 1960s and up to 1975, there was as you will remember a huge and prolonged growth of expenditure on public services, notably health and education. This growth was quite substantially offset by a *decline* of spending on defence, as a percentage of GNP, which fell over that period from ten per cent of GNP to five per cent. This decline in a sense funded a lot of growth of other public expenditure without increasing government borrowing or rates of taxation. But now, since the mid-1970s with changes in the military balance, defence expenditure has not only flattened out, which from the point of view of other public services would be bad enough, but as a part of NATO policy has turned round into possibly the fastest growing programme of the next decade. This inevitably is putting and will continue to put pressure on other public expenditure.

Were I talking to a general audience the next big programme with deep seated pressure for growth which I would list, would without doubt be health. Of course there are sound *prima facie* arguments for more health expenditure. The increasing numbers of the very old. The increasing range and sometimes cost of treatments available. The increasing cost of staff, at least over the longer term. But as public health expenditure grows, relative to GNP and to other expenditure programmes, the more the health programme stands out as an expensive competitor for resources which are so badly needed for other uses.

That is all that I propose to say on the general economic scene. I will conclude with a few words on cash planning, and then on efficiency.

Cash planning

First, cash planning. As you will know, central public expenditure planning in its modern form dates from the Plowden Report of 1961. This led to rolling programmes of public expenditure, which were expressed essentially in terms of volumes of input, to be delivered at whatever prices would then prevail. The presumption was that levels of service, once planned, should be provided. And this is an idea which many people still see as fundamental. But it is a principle from which successive governments have retreated, since the mid-1970s.

Cash limits were introduced for two main reasons. One was to build in some automatic response to higher than expected inflation. Instead of just paying higher bills, bodies with cash limited programmes need to cut back on volume to keep within their cash totals. The other reason, more subtle and to my mind even more important, was to change the way in which public service managers, and government departments including the Treasury, perceive public expenditure. Without cash limits there was little

positive incentive, within the limits of propriety, to minimise the costs of services for which allowance had been made in public expenditure plans. It was also difficult at the centre to contain pressures for unplanned increases, for which excellent reasons can always be put forward; whereas with cash limits new items of expenditure can generally be allowed only if something else is sacrificed.

Cash limits have worked well. But they were not as fundamental a change as many at the time believed. They could certainly, for good or ill, squeeze a programme in a particular year – witness the squeeze on the NHS in 1979 – 80. But come the next year, the baseline for planning, and the subsequent discussions about the level of provision, were again in volume; the new cash limits, where these applied, being based on these volume plans.

Cash *planning* changes this radically. The baseline for planning, and the discussions between spending departments and the Treasury, are now directly in terms of cash. Indeed this year discussions will start from the cash figures for 1983 – 84 which were settled last year and published in the Public Expenditure White Paper last month.

This should have two effects in particular which are immensely important. Both are analogous to the in-year effects of cash limits, but they extend more broadly.

First, there is no question now of any relative price increases, that is price increases over and above general inflation, being built without explicit discussion into the planning baseline. Under volume planning, if relative prices increased, they were automatically allowed for, at least retrospectively, as the plans were revalued at the beginning of each Public Expenditure Survey. Under cash planning the Treasury will need evidence that any such relative price rises are justified, before agreeing that the cash figures should allow for them. This is already improving the Treasury's, and dare I say it Departments', understanding of some programmes.

But even more important, I believe, is the impact of cash planning over time on our perception of public expenditure. The historic tradition, and it is an honourable tradition, has been to assess needs and then do one's best to obtain the money to meet these needs. The effect of cash planning should be not to reduce our concern with meeting needs, but to direct our concern simultaneously and with equal emphasis to needs on the one hand and the availability of finance on the other. This should focus attention on the question not only of "how much money do we need for these activities?" but also, at an early stage, "how much can we do with this amount of money?" and in particular and more positively, "how can we make even *better use* of this money?".

Sometimes both cash limits and cash planning seen, cynically, as devices constructed by the Treasury simply to contain public expenditure.

I dare say you would not believe me if I said that there was nothing in this. Our institutional arrangements are such that spending departments put relatively more emphasis on those interests which they are specially serving, while the Treasury is concerned with the impact on the rest of the economy. But there is much more to it than this. Cash planning is a procedure designed to help achieve, over time, important changes of perception in public expenditure management at all levels.

Cash planning is of course in its early days and still evolving. There are several issues on which we will need to learn by experience. One operational point which has been put to me is that capital expenditure planning needs at least a relatively secure two or three year horizon, and that abandonment of volume plans has removed this. Cash planning does indeed transfer some of the uncertainty about real public expenditure away from the centre out to operational management. I am not yet sure how serious a problem this will prove to be: or indeed if it is really a problem, or whether it may even help to further encourage the continuing appraisal of priorities.

But although there will be modifications to cash planning as it develops, and the change will be difficult and in important respects revolutionary, it is in no sense an experiment. It is a revolution to which the Treasury attaches the very highest priority.

Efficiency in health expenditure

Let me conclude with a very few words on efficiency.

I have talked of a number of long run trends in the economy. There have also been important trends in the approach of the Treasury, and other central departments, to management efficiency in the spending of public money. One trend has been an increasing emphasis on *delegation* of authority, to and within government departments, and beyond. Another has been an increasing *central* concern with the operational efficiency of those to whom money is allocated. On the face of it these two trends contradict each other. But in fact they fit well together. Delegation of authority is very important. But it cannot be absolute. A department, for example, may have delegated authority from the Treasury to approve specific expenditures up to a certain level. But the Treasury still has some responsibility for ensuring that the Department has and maintains efficient systems for planning and controlling these expenditures. This is a distribution of responsibility which can be repeated at each tier from the Treasury right through to the final expenditure of the money and its consequences.

The Treasury's role here is still evolving and must in any case be limited. The final resonsibility for expenditure lies with the Department. And the Treasury is far too small to monitor Departmental systems compre-

hensively. But this heightened central concern with the efficiency of *systems* is an important development in public expenditure management, which I am sure is here to stay.

There are several aspects of efficiency in health expenditure which interest us at present. One good example is the review of CAPRICODE; which should achieve in England a great advance in the appraisal and planning of capital projects; both streamlining procedures, and at the same time ensuring more consideration of objectives and alternative ways of achieving them. The development of these procedures seems to take a most extraordinary length of time, and they point the way to further frontiers. But in many ways they are a model, which I find it useful to quote as an example to other services.

Conclusion

That is all that I wish to say, but let me summarise the main points.

- First, extra money spent by Government nowadays has to come from somewhere else. This necessarily means more taxation or higher interest rates. These in turn means less economic growth. Public expenditure as a whole therefore is and is likely to remain under pressure for many years to come.
- Second, *within* public expenditure, health is facing increasing competition, especially from social security and defence. It is also becoming increasingly conspicuous as a programme which has shown apparently inexorable growth, relative to the national resources available. Health expenditure is therefore likely to be under particular scrutiny.
- Third, *much* hinges upon the extent to which the increasing demand for health care can be met with a less than proportionate increase in public expenditure.

A New Printing Works for Hansard

W N Frost



Norman Frost is Director of Parliamentary and Classified Printing at the headquarters of Her Majesty's Stationery Office in Sovereign House, Norwich.

Introduction

The *Official Report of the Proceedings of the House of Commons* is called Hansard after Thomas Curzon Hansard, the first Printer of the Proceedings who became associated with the task of producing a daily record in 1803 for the publisher William Cobbett.

Cobbett fell into financial difficulty, and his work was taken over by Hansard in 1811. Although it was a daily record, each edition was published more than a week after the event.

HMSO assumed the responsibility for the publishing of Hansard in 1909, and the printing in 1920, when the first HMSO printing press was established in Bethnal Green. This later moved to Pocock Street, SE1 until bomb damage in 1940 necessitated a further move to Drury Lane. All official Parliamentary printing was brought together in 1961 under one roof at St Stephen's Parliamentary Press, on the site of the earlier Pocock Street factory.

©Crown Copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 233–240

The Speaker, Rt Hon. George Thomas, MP examining copies of Hansard with Barney Hayhoe, MP, Minister of State, Treasury, following the Official Opening of the Press last November.

Since St Stephen's opened, Parliamentary printing has more than doubled and as further growth is expected an expansion of production facilities has been necessary. After detailed investigations it was decided, in 1975, to establish a new purpose-built press using modern technology to produce Hansard. The result is Hansard Press built in 1979, fitted out during 1980 and officially opened by the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Rt Hon. George Thomas MP on 17 November 1981.

Production of the first A4 copy of Commons Hansard at Hansard Press on 12 January 1981 marked the realisation of the first stage of a two-stage project to improve HMSO's parliamentary printing facilities to obtain the benefits of computer-assisted typesetting and lithographic printing, and a change of page size from Large Royal Octavo ($9\frac{3}{4}$" x $6\frac{7}{8}$") to the international standard A4 ($11\frac{3}{4}$" x $8\frac{1}{4}$"). HMSO's other parliamentary press – St Stephen's – still copes successfully with the main burden of the parliamentary workload even though its equipment and methods have become outdated.

The major change in technology was accompanied by the need for a commensurate change in attitudes and working practices. It is the success of Hansard Press in these areas that has given HMSO sufficient confidence to progress with the second stage of the project scheduled to commence production in late 1985.

The Building

Hansard Press is a purpose-built factory situated near the Elephant and Castle, just two miles from the Palace of Westminster. It occupies a single storey of 40,000 sq ft and consists of five departments: Administration, Origination (that is, composing), Platemaking, Printing, and Warehousing and Engineering Services.

The building was designed very much with energy conservation in mind, and environmental conditions are aligned to the needs of each department, for example, air conditioning for the computer room, and special glare-free lighting for the operators of visual display units. Different types of floor construction are used, giving raised flooring in the computer and keyboarding areas and washable areas in departments using chemicals.

Investment in the building amounts to over £0.75m for specialised fixtures and fittings. The main construction is rented at very competitive terms.

Equipment and production systems

The equipment and production methods employed are among the most advanced in the country. Investment in equipment has totalled over £1.25m, and a very high proportion of British technology has been utilised. A description of the operations is given below.

A general view of the origination area where edited copy from the 'House' is input to the Ferranti computer system.



The computer control consoles and photosetters.



The two web-offset machines used for printing Hansard.

Copy for *Daily Hansard,* produced by the Editorial Department at the House of Commons, is transported to the Press by Messengers at approximately hourly intervals throughout the night and is taken first to the Origination Department. Supervisory staff apportion the copy into 'takes' for setting and allocate a file reference for the computer system. Setting is undertaken by keyboard operators using QWERTY or Linotype lay keyboards attached to a visual display unit (VDU). The VDU displays 25 lines of 80 characters with automatic hyphenation and justification provided by the terminal processor.

As each 'take' is completed the operator instructs the system to generate a proof from a lineprinter. The two lineprinters are each capable of producing 460 lines of text per minute. This proof, together with the copy, is then passed to the reading section for checking. If the setting includes tables a typeset paper proof is also generated and supplied to the reader. Lineprinter proofs not only contain text but also the symbols which represent the typographic commands required for composition, and it is the reader's task to check all aspects of this proof.

After checking, proofs are returned to the keyboard section for any corrections to be made. Once this is completed the keyboard operator instructs the system to accept the 'take' as a finished job and the system responds by moving it into an area of memory used for making up pages. At this point the 'take' comes under the control of the computer room staff.

The Ferranti CS7 computer system consists of two computer suites comprising in each suite: an Argus 700G main file processor (96k memory), an Argus 700G terminal processor (32k memory), a 64 megabyte hard disc unit, a magnetic tape deck and a high speed lineprinter. Each suite also has two types of interactive send and receive systems. The first is via a teletype which is used to interrogate the computer's operating system, while the second is a Trend printer keyboard with a VDU on which the operator gives typographic commands and receives confirmation/information from the computers.

Once a sequence of 'takes' of sufficient length is recorded on the control monitor, the computer operator instructs the system to make up pages. These made-up pages are fed in digital form to one of the Linotron 404 photo-typesetters via underfloor cables, and a film positive is made. In this machine characters are stored by breaking them up into thin vertical 'slices' and converting the slices to digitised data. Loading is by floppy disc, and an image is reconstructed by a character generation board in conjunction with a microspot cathode ray tube system. In this way there is no physical master image of the typefount, and each letter is described to a precise predetermined tolerance. The Hansard Press system is equipped with a commercial fount package which allows a wide range of typefaces to be instantly available for general work. The photosetters can be loaded with either film or bromide paper.

The exposed material is automatically fed into the dark room where computer room staff manually feed it into one of the LogE film processors. These processors produce roll of positive right reading film. The roll of film is then cut into pages by the photocompositors who check the film for quality. The pages are then taken to a light table and placed in a particular order on a transparent foil in such a way that when the eventual printed sheet is folded, pages are sequential. Foils containing up to eight pages are passed to the platemaking section for the next process.

Foils are positioned in vacuum contact with presensitised aluminium sheets in one of the three Parker Graphic Sovereign 500 exposure frames. The top of the vacuum frame is transparent, and the whole structure tilts to allow the plate to be exposed to a light source through the foil. The exposed plate is then automatically developed, fixed and washed on one of two Howson Algraphy automatic plate processors. The plate is then ready to be passed on to the Printing Department.

Hansard is produced on two twin-unit web-offset Linotype Hunter presses. These machines use a 35-inch wide reel of paper as a continuous web, and can print a maximum of 32 pages A4 at a time. The section size can be varied from eight to 32 pages A4 in four-page steps, and the press produces about 17,000 sections per hour. There is also a Heidelberg SORM sheet-fed press, used to print the *Weekly Hansard* covers and the postal wrappers for Hansard items.

The printing plates are punched and bent prior to fitting onto the cylinders of the Hunters. A 32-page section requires four plates, and when the press is running each web (a large roll of paper weighing approximately half a ton) passes through a pair of printing cylinders to print eight pages simultaneously on both sides of the paper. The two webs come together at the end of the machine where they pass through a folding unit to produce a 32-page section. The sections are then fed on to a small machine which compresses manageable loads into bundles which are secured by straps and then palletised.

Pallets of sections are then transported to the warehouse where they are finished on a Muller gatherer/stitcher. These are then wrapped in individual preprinted postage sleeves ready for collection by the Post Office.

It is a feature of Hansard Press that all equipment is provided with back-up facilities, either mechanically or manually, in case of serious mechanical/electrical breakdown. This, together with an electricity generator, means that most eventualities can be accommodated and the supply of parliamentary papers is not prone to disruption from equipment failures. This is particularly important in view of the tight timetable involved and the relatively high volume of work produced. The average issue of *Daily Hansard* amounts to 96 pages of A4 and contains

approximately 100,000 words. In total, 6,500 copies of *Daily Hansard* and 2,000 copies for inclusion in *Weekly Hansard* are printed overnight using approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ tonnes of paper. About 1,000 copies are sent to individual addresses for early morning reading by Members of Parliament and subscribers.

Other Parliamentary work printed by the Press includes the production of fortnightly volumes of Commons Hansard and some of the Standing Committee proceedings.

The human factors

Negotiations with the industrial unions spanned a period of approximately 18 months and involved nine chapels or bargaining groups. These negotiations not only covered the introduction of new technology, a major hurdle in itself, but also demarcation issues, retraining and manning together with a change of concept for shift patterns. Issues of differentials, always sensitive, became minor problems in comparison to shift timings and methods of organising the work. Staff were mainly drawn from St Stephen's Parliamentary Press which had previously produced Commons Hansard.

The new press, just as St Stephen's before it, requires that there be a maximum staff attendance in the Parliamentary Session. This means that staff are encouraged to take holidays in Recess periods, and most staff accept this. As it was not possible to move staff to the new press prior to formal agreement with the unions on the conditions package, training had to commence in the Recess. In the event, training began for Origination staff in August 1980, and from the first day it was a fight against the clock. The training schedule left little margin for the normal pattern of holidays. People who had previously had no experience of even typing a letter were trained to operate keyboards by touch typing. Men who associated computers with wrong bills from the Gas Board were immersed in a new world of command structures and bytes. This frenetic pattern continued until 1 December 1980 when the origination chapels moved onto nightwork and began setting Hansard in parallel with St Stephen's Parliamentary Press. In total this group accounted for 59 out of the 109 industrial staff at Hansard Press and presented the major portion of training.

In the machine/platemaking area a similar change in technique was encountered. The move from letterpress to lithographic printing process required staff to learn skills alien to their previous experience in the printing industry. Men who had spent 30 years making stereo printing plates from molten lead were now confronted with making lithographic plates by photographic means and operating a fast-running, twin web-offset press.

Again co-operation was forthcoming from all concerned, and though some staff found the change too much, eventually a team emerged.

Little was changed in the warehouse as the most suitable type of equipment for the job was already known and being used at St Stephen's. There was however a major change in working practices. Local management and the chapel took the opportunity to rethink the way in which the work was produced and this resulted in many suggestions – most of which were employed.

Most of the equipment in the origination area is maintained on a service contract, and should a problem arise Ferranti and Linotype Paul engineers are available, on average, within an hour. But there was a marked change in the type of equipment that the engineers and electricians were required to maintain. Special external courses on such items as thyrister drive systems were arranged, and because the section has the capacity to undertake many other types of work, specialised training in such skills as welding was given.

All Industrial staff and Non-Industrial managers work on night shift to produce Hansard, and all work a four-night week. To cover five-night production requirements, staff are split into two groups working Monday to Thursday or Tuesday to Friday. Most sections of the Press rotate between these two shift patterns but some prefer to stay on one particular shift. All of the departments, even some sections within departments, have staggered starting and finishing times so that maximum advantage is gained in production. For example, the first group of keyboard operators start work at 18.00 hours and the last group in the warehouse finish at 08.00 hours.

As the majority of those who work at Hansard Press have been involved in the production of Parliamentary Papers for some years, they are used to the pressures of tight timescales. The nature of the work has a considerable effect in terms of motivation, and all staff are fully aware of the importance of the work they produce. People have come to grips with new skills and equipment in a short space of time.

The change in environment and methods of production cannot be underestimated, and people are still adjusting. The performance of Hansard Press has been monitored by both Parliament and HMSO. Its operation has been examined very carefully, since its performance determines options for the second stage of the project. HMSO consider Stage One has been a very successful venture.

The Review of R&D Support Services

A Payne

Alan Payne is a Principal in the Ministry of Defence who has recently completed a two-year tour on loan to what is now the Management and Efficiency Group in the Management and Personnel Office.

A good deal has now been written about the Rayner scrutiny programme.* The multi-departmental reviews which are a development of the scrutiny have received rather less attention. For about eighteen months of my time in CSD/MPO, my principal task was the day-to-day co-ordination of a review of support services in R&D establishments. This article aims to describe how the review was conducted, to summarise the findings and recommendations, and to offer some thoughts on the review's contribution to efficiency in Government. It deals with my own direct experience.

Background to the review

The first multi-departmental review, of Government Statistical Services, was carried out in 1980. The basic pattern is to have a number of departments scrutinising the same subject at the same time. As with all scrutinies, the examining officers report to their departmental Ministers and work under the guidance of Sir Derek Rayner. But the statistics review brought the idea of a small central team to advise and assist the examining officers and to do the day-to-day co-ordination.

By the summer of 1980 it was clear that the multi-departmental approach was proving very fruitful in statistics and that other topics could be tackled in a similar way. Support services in reasearch and development establishments were chosen as one of two exercises in 1981*–first because it was a large area. Of around 35,000 staff in government R&D establishments only about half are scientists and technologists actually doing R&D work. The other half are involved in providing a very wide range of services from cleaning, through clerical and administration services, to sophisticated workshops and a host of specialised facilities.

*See, for example, the articles by D R Allen, C Christie, and A Likierman in, respectively, the Winter 1981, Spring 1982 and Summer 1982 issues of RIPA Report.

*The other review subject chosen was forms–see *Government Forms,* T L Lonsdale, *Management in Government,* May 1982, pp 107–112.

©Crown Copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 241–250

This range also interested us in that there were areas like messenger services where the Civil Service Department (as it then was) had well-developed methods of assessment to offer, and others, like workshops, about which we knew little. We were keen to extend the scrutiny technique into outstations with a particular job to do (rather than local office networks or aspects of central Whitehall) and although there were a number of departments with such establishments, there was very little overlap with the departments involved in the review of administrative forms.

In the end, six Ministers (Agriculture, Defence, Environment, Industry, Overseas Development, and Transport) agreed that some or all of the support in one or more of their establishments should be included in the review. In fact 19 establishments (including 18 of the largest 25) were covered. These accounted for support services costing about £100 million a year, including 8,000 posts. Departments appointed examining officers: of the six on the review two were Principals and the others scientists.

The central team was made up of myself, Colin Evans (a scientist on loan from MOD), Andrew Stott (then an HEO(A) in CSD), and Adrian Ellis (a new entrant Administration Trainee in his first post).

Initial stages

Sir Derek Rayner chaired a seminar for examining officers of both the multi-departmental reviews to get them properly launched. We had prepared a Central Study Plan – another device first used in the statistics review – which set out the basic pattern of work. In particular we asked the examining officers to apply these basic questions to each support service:

- *What is the service for and what does it cost?*
- *Is the service necessary?*—What would be the penalties of simply dropping the task? Could its frequency, quality etc. be changed without damaging essential work?
- *Does it have to be done by Civil Servants?*—Could the private sector provide an adequate service at the same or less cost?
- *Does it have to be done by Civil Servants on-site?*—Could it be provided more efficiently from headquarters or from some other establishment?
- *How can the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations be improved?*—Are there better methods? Would more delegation make sense? Are unnecessary rules and regulations getting in the way?

The Central Study Plan also stipulated that establishments would provide the examining officers with a 'starting brief' containing the key

facts about the establishment, including its objectives and targets. The idea was that, since examining officers would face a considerable information-gathering task, it would save time if the basic information were provided early on by the establishments. We asked the following.

(1) *What does the establishment do?*—What are its main programmes of research, what services does it provide?

(2) *What resources are being consumed?*—Numbers and grades of staff; nature and value of assets; the full running costs, including services provided without payment (for example accommodation)?

(3) *How are the resources being applied?*—How much of each of the inputs at (2) is going to each of the outputs at (1) and are they charged direct to the programmes or treated as a common service?

The responses were fascinating. Most examining officers soon arrived in my room looking glum and clutching either a four-inch thick computer printout answering all the questions plus many others, or a few sheets of A4 listing the questions and answering most with 'not known' or 'not understood'. Our briefing request turned out to be a crude diagnostic instrument for the health of establishments' costing systems. With hindsight we should always have had an accountant on the central team. And if at this point we had appointed one, we could have had a much clearer view of the strengths and weaknesses in establishments' costing systems, and advice as to where a deeper study by accountants or management consultants would have assisted the examining officer. In fact we tended too much towards waiting for examining officers to feel the need of help from Civil Service accountants or the private sector.

Once examining officers felt they had enough data to go on, they cleared plans for their work with their Ministers and Sir Derek Rayner and began their fieldwork. In the meantime, the central team was discussing with examining officers what specialised help they would need. Most had a full-time assistant to help with the leg work, but also plainly needed extra help. A good deal came from the specialists in what is now the Management and Efficiency Group in MPO—in areas like messenger services, stores, transport, and telecommunications. MOD's Management Services organisation provided considerable support through their officer.

The wealth of information from the starting briefs set us off, sooner than we had expected, on another major central team function—searching for best practice. As the volume of data mounted we covered ever larger pieces of paper with rows of key facts and figures. How could security cost twice as much in one establishment as in a similar sized one twenty miles away? Why did the ratio of typists to non-industrials, or Process and General Supervisory staff to industrials, vary so much? Why did some establishments book workshop time to projects and others book it to overheads? Very often, of course, there were excellent reasons for the

differences but comparing establishments with each other often provided useful tips for the examining officers.

Development of the review

As the fieldwork got underway, the passage of time seemed to accelerate sharply. On the central team we were trying to ensure that, without smothering the examining officers, we had an up-to-date picture of the rate at which various services were being examined, what ideas and problems were emerging, what extra help was needed, and where we could find it. The synopsis stage, at which the examining officer reports the state of his work and gives the first firm indication of what he believes the recommendations will be, seemed to come up very quickly. Most examining officers, I thought, felt some trepidation in offering their synopses to their Minister and Sir Derek Rayner; but conceded that the requirement to do so concentrated the mind and highlighted the key points that still had to be addressed.

The central team visited examining officers in the field to get first-hand knowledge of the establishments. Such visits took time but there was nothing to beat seeing for yourself. We had to get our own 'feel' for what a support service manager actually did and how he judged the efficiency of his service. We also started to try out ideas that looked as if they might represent best practice.

As well as visiting government establishments in the review, Andrew Stott led small groups of examining officers on visits to private sector research establishments to see how they handled support services. This was invaluable in that it showed us a way out of the biggest problem then in view. In the government establishments, the support service manager usually had some sort of budget or staff allocation, but the costs of his services were charged to overheads or *per capita* between the research divisions. For the line managers responsible for the research projects there was no direct link between the amount of support services used and the charges to the project. The support services manager was put in the position of trying to meet every demand to the best of his ability. Since the service was not properly costed, neither the user nor the provider was able to judge whether particular proposals or levels of service added value equal to their cost.

In the private sector support services managers had their own budget or profit centres and charged for services provided to other centres. They had their own rate of return to achieve, and, unlike most government establishments, had no monopoly. Line managers had considerable freedom to buy services from outside if the in-house service was more expensive. This was a marked contrast to the government establishments where a high proportion of the inefficiencies that examining officers were

finding seemed to stem from the system of concentrating on quality of output without anyone being asked to judge the value for money that different levels of output represented.

The results

What did we have at the end of all this? One complete set of the examining officers' reports is about eight inches high, with over 400 individual recommendations. Pulling all this together was a big task. The full account is in Sir Derek Rayner's report * to the Prime Minister, but the main findings can be summarised as follows.

Examining officers proposed savings of some £14.0m a year at 1981–2 prices (14 per cent) and £6.6m once for all. The annual savings include 1,500 posts – 19 per cent of those covered. The evidence from the reports showed six important themes.

- *Over-provision of services* accounted for more than half the proposed staff savings. For example, anything from six to ten messenger rounds a day when two or three were usually enough. Vehicles were often kept in such numbers that very little use was made of them. Stores were usually open and manned all day ('in case there is an urgent requirement') but made only a few issues of low-value items. In one group of stores the staff sometimes had as little as one hour a day of essential duties.
- *Too many services in-house* led to recommendations for saving about 350 posts. This was a curiously mixed picture in that almost every establishment could point to some service where it was making cost-effective use of the private sector. But there was a marked tendency to think that outside suppliers should be used only when the in-house facility could not cope. And nearly every establishment was doing something for itself which the private sector could do cheaper (and often better). Two in-house security services were costing around twice as much as an adequate commercial service. In-house animal-breeding in one laboratory was reckoned to cost between four and thirty times the market price.
- *Waste of land and buildings* was noticeable in several establishments. While staff numbers had declined in recent years, accommodation had stayed the same – or even increased. The establishments tended to be shielded from the costs of accommodation because, conventionally, most of those costs were either not on the department's Vote or, where they were, did not form part of the Director's budget. There was no real incentive to be economical. In

*Available from the Central Management Library, Management and Personnel Office, Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2AZ, price £3.50.

all, examining officers recommended 270 acres of land and 450,000 square feet of buildings for disposal. While much of the space was relatively cheap storage and workshop buildings, 450,000 square feet *is* a lot of buildings.

- *Unrealistic charges* for information and services meant that establishments were recovering to little from customers – in total at least £700,000 a year too little. This was mostly because their costing systems did not give a clear enough picture of how costs arose. But some establishments gave away reports, and information and advice which had clear commercial value.
- *Too much bureaucracy* was evident in many establishments. Recommendations to get rid of it accounted for about 350 of the staff savings. There were two main problems here. First, the recording and checking of transactions in extreme detail, especially in stores. The initial reaction when examining officers proposed severe pruning was, 'What happens to public accountability?' I doubt whether, for example, the PAC would wish departments to spend £1 of public money to protect every £1 of public property. And in a number of establishments the cost of recording issues, checking balances, stocktaking etc. down to literally every last nut and bolt doubled the cost of the stock.

  The second main problem was that while scientists in line management usually had some sort of budget, it was rarely comprehensive or completely under their own control. For example, the MOD examining officer found that the line managers rarely had direct control over more than ten per cent of the resources they consumed. Moreover, while 'budgets' often existed for minor equipment, the scientist usually could not spend money without seeking the permission of an administrator who scrutinised the proposal 'in the Accounting Officer's interest'. We came to think that this sort of thing ran largely counter to the Accounting Officer's interest – which is of course vitally concerned with value for money as well as regularity and propriety. The people who are most able to affect value for money are the scientists/engineers whose work is causing the expenditure. Also, if they have proper budgets, they will be clearly motivated towards getting the best value for money. Continuous second-guessing by administrators is unlikely to lead to better decisions and tends to be, as the MOD examining officer put it, 'a routine and ineffective check'.

Recommendations

Sir Derek Rayner's report to the Prime Minister contains 12 recommendations split into three groups:

(1) *For top management* in departments—ensuring that establishments work within the right management framework;
(2) *For line management*—ensuring that work reflects top management's priorities, and that costs are properly attributed to accountable managers and held to the essential minimum;
(3) *For central departments* (Treasury, MPO and the Property Services Agency)—looking at current rules and practices which do not assist departments as much as they should.

The most important recommendations are:

- Departments should examine the practical value of current arrangements for reporting technical and financial progress on R&D projects to Ministers.
- Directors of establishments should have a 'charter' clearly setting out the objectives and scope of the establishment, and the Director's authority and accountability for running it efficiently.
- Costs in establishments should be properly charged to programmes, with the scientists/engineers as accountable managers.
- All Ministers with R&D establishments should consider the recommendation in the MOD report that the routine second-guessing by administrations of scientists' proposals to spend from their budgets should cease. Instead, the scientists should be responsible for their own proposals, and the administrators should conduct more effective value-for-money investigations on a highly selective sample of cases.
- A senior manager within each establishment should have responsibility for holding down accommodation costs and clarifying the establishment's requirements for the Property Services Agency (PSA), who should look again at the balance of responsibility between PSA and the establishment for specifying and obtaining highly specialised building services.
- The Treasury should consider with departments how encouragement can be given to reinvest efficiency savings in schemes to further increase efficiency and improve staff motivation.
- The MPO should examine the criteria used for recruiting and training scientists and other specialists to ensure that the need for management skills is properly reflected.

The review's contribution to the search for efficiency

Up to now I have been dealing almost entirely with fact. To close the article I would like to offer my opinion of what the review has contributed to efficiency work more generally. At this fairly early stage after presentation of the reports there is an element of speculation, but I believe that the developments and lessons will prove long-lasting.

First, I believe the review made some useful contributions to the methodology of efficiency work. It came as close as anything yet to bridging the gap between 'pure' scrutiny method and the more established methods like staff inspection and work-measurement. It took, for example, the detailed expertise of specialists in stores management or in transport or in messengerial services etc., and married their knowledge and techniques with the commitment to radical questioning and action on recommendations, which is the hallmark of the scrutiny process. The strong interest of top management in scrutinies and the care in selecting suitable subjects are reflections of a clear policy in central government for efficiency and a targeted programme for tackling the issues.

The results in the support services review rest partly on challenging conventional wisdom, but also heavily on the painstaking work of staff inspectors and management services staff 'sub-contracted' to the examining officers. To achieve change it is necessary to present incontrovertible evidence that change is necessary and that things are not right as they are. In the support services area, the traditional examining officer plus one or two helpers could never have covered the ground. Our examining officers were mostly nearer to team leaders than solo scrutineers. All used the services of a number of experts at various stages of the work. The experts performed the invaluable function of assessing the detailed evidence and, usually, identifying the procedure and policies which needed to be challenged.

This attempt to get 'the best of both' and bring to bear, in a single study, a package of the best available investigatory methods, is being repeated in 1982 in six so-called 'Resource Control Reviews' which are examining the management and use of resources by important executive operations (the prison service, the PSA district works service, the coastguard service, support for the RAF, the Royal Mint, and the Meteorological Office).

The review has provided further powerful evidence of the great value of comparing the procedures used, and costs generated, by different organisations performing similar tasks. Comparing the costs of the personnel function or the library service per head of staff, or the level of authority enjoyed by clerical officers to approve some particular type of order does not, of course, produce some splendid and self-evident 'right' answer. But time after time it raises very pertinent questions. It helps to identify best practice and to ease resistance to change. Most line managers will hesitate at a recommendation to increase dramatically a level of delegation. If another similarly-placed organisation can be shown to be already doing what is proposed, or something close, it is a powerful argument.

On the broader themes of efficiency policy, the review has contributed to two very important strands:

(1) That, given the will to succeed at the most senior levels, there is still room for significant specific improvements;

(2) That there are fundamental lessons to be drawn by standing back from the specific findings and considering why things are as they are. These include:

- that cost-awareness is fundamental to an efficient organisation; and
- that the proper delegation of authority to levels at which effective choice can be made – coupled with a sensible approach to holding people accountable – is by far the most sensible way of keeping costs down.

The scrutinies and reviews have often produced savings of ten, 15 and 20 per cent. This can be larger than management initially believe possible. The importance of cost-awareness is demonstrated by the way in which many of the reports in the review show how savings arise from making a cost-comparison which it had always been possible to make but which 'the system' had not brought to any prominence. The system provided masses of information but not of the sort which showed where improvements could be made. The complex, yet incomplete, picture which many Directors had of the costs of their establishments was in the starkest contrast to the best private sector establishments.

Of course cost-awareness in the public sector will not of itself improve efficiency very greatly; top management must also spell out what it expects in the way of improvements. But without very much better costing systems we cannot hope to give the taxpayer the best value for money. If we work in the dark we shall only get things right by accident.

The review has given the principle of accountable management in the Civil Service a further boost. If I were asked to pick the single area in which I think most progress was made I would plump for the recommendations to give more authority and accountability to scientists and other specialists. Though an administrator myself, I have long regarded the idea that the Accounting Officer's interest was the exclusive interest of administrators as dangerous nonsense. The formal requirements of public accountability should not detract from the requirement on the head of any organisation to make it run as efficiently as possible. That requirement must be the concern of all, and any responsible employee, whatever his specialisation, must be involved in it.

Reform and Clout*

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attacking the reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend him half-heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger. It is necessary, however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question, to examine whether these innovators are independent, or whether they depend upon others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out their designs they have to entreat or are able to compel. In the first case they invariably succeed ill, and accomplish nothing; but when they can depend on their own strength and are able to use force, they rarely fail.

THE PRINCE
BY NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI
FROM THE TRANSLATION BY
LUIGI RICCI
REVISED BY
E. R. P. VINCENT
Oxford University Press, London W.1

*cf *We Tried Before but Without the Clout*, P Nash, *Management Services in Government*, August 1981, pp 137–144.

Managing a Government Department

S D Walker CBE FBIM

Immediately prior to his retirement at the end of 1977, 'Johnny' Walker was head of the Management Services (Special Assignments) Division of the Civil Service Department and was associated with several major management reviews of government departments. From then until early in 1981 he was engaged on a part-time basis in the Management Development Division of that department in funding experience gained on such management reviews.

Over the years there have been several articles* in *Management Services in Government* and *Management in Government* contributing in different ways to our understanding of the task of managing a government department. These articles have in the main discussed the discharge of this task at the higher levels, where major decisions on priorities have to be taken. The efficient use of the resources made available to them is, however, the concern of all managers in all areas of every department. The greater the degree of authority delegated to them, the more important it becomes for managers at middle and lower levels to be aware of

*Interested readers may, in particular, like to refer to the following:
Creating and Managing a Large Department, Sir Anthony Part GCB MBE, *Management Services in Government,* February 1979, pp 5 – 12.
Ministers and Management in Whitehall, The Rt Hon. Michael Heseltine MP, *Management Services in Government,* May 1980, pp 61 – 68.
Some Reflections on Change, Sir Patrick Nairne GCB MC, *Management in Government,* May 1982, pp 71 – 92.

©Crown copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 251 – 259

departmental priorities and objectives so that they can contribute to their achievement.

The purpose of this article is to attempt to define aspects of the management task in general terms applicable at all times to all departments and then to suggest, again in general terms, the organisational arrangements and procedures which might help the permanent head to discharge that task on behalf of his minister. The adoption of such arrangements does not, of course, prevent the emergence of particular problems which demand attention at the top. Their existence may, however, help to ensure that adequate time can be spared for specific issues without detriment to the continuing and more general aspects of the task of managing a department.

Any attempt to write in general terms about government departments encounters the difficulty that they differ in various ways from one another. But most of the propositions advanced in this article will have some relevance to all bodies described as 'government departments'. However, the article addresses itself primarily to the situation of a department headed by a minister, in whom the functions are vested by law, and who is supported by a permanent head who is the minister's chief adviser on policy, his chief executive and the controller of the department's resources.

The primary purpose for which government departments exist

Some departments exist to provide goods or services to other departments but most can be said to exist to serve ministers in the formulation and administration of government policies.

Individual ministers operate within the framework of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet as a whole. Subject to this, the minister in charge of a department is responsible to Parliament for its policies, its organisation and its management. Some ministers such as the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister in charge of the Management and Personnel Office have responsibilities which span the Government machine as a whole. Supporting the minister in charge of a department in the formulation and administration of the policies for which it is responsible thus extends to supporting him in complying with the requirements of ministers collectively and of ministers with across-the-board responsibilities. It also extends to supporting him in complying with any parliamentary requirements including discharging his accountability to Parliament.

The common framework within which departments operate

Thus a department has to operate within the framework of individual and collective ministerial responsibility. The formulation and administration of the policies for which it is responsible must have regard to actual and

potential interactions with policies allocated to other ministers and to the implications for resources. Departments have to participate in arrangements which co-ordinate Government as a whole, and comply with rules and procedures laid down for the Government machine as a whole. Such rules and procedures cover, for example, the co-ordination of policy, the Public Expenditure Survey (PES), Vote estimating and accounting, control over money, manpower and other resources, and the pay, grading and personnel management of civil servants. They also cover the arrangements for supporting ministers in discharging their accountability to Parliament.

There are also rules and conventions which determine or influence the allocation of responsibility under the minister and which reflect the collective accountability of ministers as well as of the individual minister in charge of a department. Thus there are conventions relating to the appointment and role of Accounting Officers and to the roles of Principal Finance Officers and Principal Establishment Officers. A statement of the primary purpose of a government department has to be set in this wider context.

Factors affecting the management of particular departments

It would seem possible to state the primary purposes of a government department and the framework within which it operates in terms of general application. There are, however, other factors which affect the management of particular departments. Four such factors are:

(1) Unique problems inherent in the policies for which a department is responsible;
(2) The coherence of the policies administered by a department;
(3) The 'discontinuity' which sometimes exists between the formulation of policy and its implementation;
(4) The nature of a department's expenditure.

Unique problems inherent in the policies for which a department is responsible

All departments have problems to overcome in obtaining and processing information on which to evaluate policy options and to monitor and review existing policies. To a considerable extent, each Government policy can be said to require its own tailor-made policy information system: an information system separate from but related to the department's management information system. There are, however, also unique problems, inherent in the nature of each policy, in seeking to define its purposes, the criteria by which success in achieving those purposes can be judged, and the operational standards of effectiveness to be achieved (and which are consistent with the purposes and criteria of success). For

example, some of the concepts and criteria used for defining and monitoring the aims of policies in respect of education will be different from those used for the policies in respect of health.

The coherence of the policies administered by a department
In practice there are significant differences in the relative coherence of the blocks of policy responsibilities allocated to departments. In some cases those responsibilities form a single coherent programme and the minister in charge has considerable discretion in deciding how to allocate the total amount of money and other resources made available to him for the programme as a whole. Sometimes, however, those responsibilities cover a number of distinct policy programmes and he has very little discretion in deciding the distribution of money as between those discrete programmes. In other cases, the programmes may fall into separate PES categories. The minister and his department will, of course, still be the main source of advice on the relative priorities as between the separate policy programmes, but there are constraints in such cases which affect the task of managing the department and its expenditure as an entity.

The 'discontinuity' which sometimes exists between the formulation of policy and its implementation
All departments of the type which I have described formulate and administer policy, and some of them also have responsibility for the executive task of implementing their policies. However, some departments look to external bodies – over which they often have little or no formal authority – to implement their policies. In such cases, a significant 'discontinuity' is created in the total task of formulating, administering and implementing Government policies. Planning and control as discussed in most management textbooks are usually assumed to take place within a single organisational and management hierarchy. In contrast to this, some aspects of departmental planning relate to issues over which the department cannot exercise managerial control.

The nature of a department's expenditure
All departments incur some expenditure on real resources such as staff and items, such as accommodation, office machinery and supplies intimately connected with the employment of those staff. In a revenue department, expenditure of this type constitutes virtually the total of its Vote expenditure. In civil departments which have responsibility for a large-scale executive task of implementing policy as well as for its formulation and administration, expenditure of this type constitutes a significant element of their Vote payments. However, the bulk of the Vote expenditure in many civil departments is on distributive payments (or 'transfers' as they

are sometimes called) such as payments of subsidies, grants, or benefits. In contrast to this, the bulk of the total Vote expenditure of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is on real resources since, in addition to the expenditure on its own civilian staff, MOD spends substantial sums on the acquisition of weapons, equipment, installations, and military manpower. These differences in the nature of the expenditure of a department affect the ways in which economy, efficiency and effectiveness can be secured. That is to say, they affect the way in which financial and other resources are managed.

The context in which a department is managed

It will be seen that the management of a government department has not only to be undertaken within a wider constitutional and political framework and within a framework of management of the Civil Service machine as a whole, but that it is also affected by the nature and coherence of the blocks of policy for which it is responsible by the many and varying relationships with external bodies which may implement its policies, and by the nature of the expenditure which it incurs. These factors and other influences may also result in differences in size, organisation, staffing, and geographical location and in differences in procedures and methods, all of which will affect the task of managing the department as an entity.

Against this background and the fact that each department has unique policy aims, the question arises whether there is any possibility at all of defining the management task in terms which are of general application.

The common management task and aim

Despite the many differences between departments and the fact that each has a unique area of policy responsibilities, the experience of the management review programme suggests that they all have a top management task which can be described in common terms. Essentially, that task is concerned with the use of financial and other resources in the formation and pursuit of Government policies. In practice, this inevitably means that it is a task which involves both policy planning and resource planning and the integration of these in an overall management planning process. This management planning process is particularly concerned with establishing priorities as between competing policy demands for available resources.

At the level of Government as a whole, the PES machinery provides a planning framework for relating potential demands for money to the total amount which the Government considers can and should be made available for public expenditure. Choices are then made between competing policy demands, and decisions taken to reduce expenditure on some policy programmes in order to remain within the ceiling determined

or to accommodate, within that ceiling, expenditure on new policy proposals or increased expenditure on some existing programmes.

At departmental level, it is necessary to contribute to and participate in the PES processes. It may also be necessry, at that level, to achieve economies in order to remain within the resultant allocation to the department. In addition, and subject to any constraints on his authority to do so, the minister in charge of a department will wish to decide how the money and resources made available should be allocated. A department, therefore, needs its own processes for assessing the demand for financial and other resources, comparing this with the allocation which it expects will be approved, and for determining its priorities. It will then be able to allocate the financial and other resources made available to it to the best advantage and to judge how economies can be achieved with the least damage to departmental programmes.

In an earlier article* I suggested that a common aim could be stated for the task of managing a department. I proposed, as a tentative definition, 'to achieve and maintain the best balance between economy, efficiency and effectiveness (including equity) in the use of resources in the formation and execution of Government policy'. It is not necessary, in considering the task itself, to seek agreement to the idea of a common aim expressed in these particular terms – though those who disagree with it should be prepared to suggest some alternative guidance for carrying out the task and for judging how well it is performed.

The main contributions required

The proposition that departments have to relate policies to resources and determine priorities is neither novel nor particularly profound. It may nevertheless be worth restating and not solely because of the current emphasis on limiting the resources available to the public sector. Definition of the task is the first step if we are to consider what is involved in discharging it. But it is only the first step, and a danger with generalised descriptions is that they tend to oversimplify what they describe. If we consider briefly what is involved in undertaking the task and how the various contributions can best be brought together at the top of a department, it may be easier to comprehend the nature and complexity of that task. The contributions of four main areas have been selected for discussion. These are the policy area of a department, the Principal Finance Officer (PFO), the Principal Establishment Officer (PEO), and, where they form part of the department, the operational commands responsible for the execution of policy.

**The Management Aim of a Government Department*, S D Walker CBE, *Management Services in Government*, August 1980, pp 129 – 135.

The policy area

The policy area of a department can advise on the financial and other resources required for existing policies and on the expenditure implications of new policy proposals. It can carry out reviews of existing policies to check that they are achieving their purposes and to identify options for securing economies. It can also advise on the priorities as between competing policies. For these purposes it will have to undertake policy planning which includes both policy analysis and policy review and may require the assistance of specialist staff.

It would be quite wrong to imply that all policy innovations can always be preceded by a deliberate and exhaustive process of analysis. In his article on the civil servant as policy adviser* Mr Wilding pointed out that a great deal of policy advice is generated not by the deliberate maturing of the Government's thinking about its social, economic or defence policies but by external events to which it has to react quickly. Advisers on policy are often working against time on problems where facts are in short supply, the opportunities for consultation are constrained, and civil servants must simply do the best that they can. It may sometimes be very difficult indeed to make any reliable estimate of the full financial implications of policy proposals.

In practice, therefore, the emphasis has to be placed upon ensuring that the PFO, and, where appropriate, the PEO, are always alerted and given the best information available when policy changes with implications for resources are under consideration; upon monitoring the policy carefully; and upon a programme of reviews of carefully selected policies designed to check their cost-effectiveness and the efficiency with which they are being implemented.

The Principal Finance Officer

The PFO has to ensure that the costs of new and existing policies are assessed on a satisfactory and consistent basis. He can aggregate the demands and, through his involvement in the PES processes, can compare the total with his forecasts of the PES and Vote allocations and the cash limits which are likely to be determined. He can thus advise on the demand and availability of financial resources, and on the need to make savings in order to remain within the agreed limits or to accommodate new policy requirements within those ceilings.

The PFO has a general responsibility under his permanent head for advising on economy in the use of financial resources. He may suggest areas, perhaps drawn to his attention by his internal audit branch, for inclusion in the programme of reviews where he believes that savings might be achieved by the more cost-effective use of financial resources.

**The Civil Servant as Policy Adviser,* R W L Wilding CB, *Management Services in Government,* August 1980, pp 117–122.

The Principal Establishment Officer

The PEO is usually responsible to his permanent head for personnel management and for control over manpower and staff-related resources such as accommodation, office machines and office supplies. Broadly, therefore, his field of responsibility covers the resources which a department itself uses. As regards control over resources, he co-operates with the PFO in ensuring that between them they cover all elements of their expenditure and can advise on the economic use of all the resources available to them.

Contributions from the PEO include forecasts of the demand for and supply of manpower. He has to ensure that demands for manpower are assessed on a satisfactory and consistent basis. He aggregates the demands and, as the PFO does for demands for financial resources, compares the total with his forecast of the manpower allocation likely to be approved. He can thus advise on the need to make savings in the use of manpower and, like the PFO, may suggest areas identified perhaps by examination of the costs which they incur, which should be reviewed by his staff inspectors or management services staff. Under present arrangments both he and the PFO may also suggest areas for examination as part of the Rayner scrutiny programme.

The PEO also advises on personnel management questions including any major recruitment problems, questions of succession planning, and the morale and efficiency of staff. He also reports on the outcome of major organisational, procedural and ADP studies with important implications for manpower and staff-related resources.

Operational commands

Where a department has operational commands responsible for the executive task of implementing policy, the senior managers of those commands can advise upon the resources required to undertake the operational tasks, including the resource implications of the standards of effectiveness which they are required to achieve in implementing policies. They can also advise on the scope for increased efficiency within their commands. More generally, they can advise on the operational feasibility of proposed arrangements for implementing policies.

Contributions from other areas

The contributions discussed above will almost certainly require the support and involvement of specialist staff such as accountants, economists, operational research staff, and statisticians. Supporting staff units may also be needed to undertake specific tasks such as forecasting manpower supply or assisting the policy area in policy planning. In some departments, special functions such as research and development may make a very important contribution to the planning and execution of

policy. In short, I readily recognise that the formulation and execution of Government policy requires a wide range of professional as well as administrative contributions and that all of these contributions have to be linked to the planning process.

Co-ordination of the contributions

The contributions which have been outlined above can usually only be co-ordinated by the permanent head of a department. Normally, responsibility for policy advice, resource control and operations comes together only at that level, and decisions on overall departmental priorities have to be taken by him in consultation, as necessary, with his minister. In a small department where all the senior staff are accommodated in close proximity and are frequently in contact with each other and with the permanent head, he may prefer to discharge this task without having any formal arrangements for regular meetings. But experience suggests that even in small departments, and certainly in large ones, there are advantages in having an advisory top management board or strategic planning committee to assist the permanent head. Such a body will normally include the PFO and PEO, the most senior policy staff, and, where implementation of policy is a departmental responsibility, the head of the operational command, with the permanent head in the chair.

A body of the character envisaged is not, of course, a 'corporate' body in the strict sense of that term. It is *advisory* to the permanent head. Nevertheless, it can provide a valuable forum for involving senior staff in the corporate discussion of departmental priorities and can help to obtain their understanding of, and commitment to, departmental strategies and objectives. It can thus assist in securing the co-operation of all areas of the department in supporting the management aim of balancing economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in the demands for money and the use of resources. In particular, the presence of the PFO and PEO makes it easier to ensure that all are aware of any policy developments which require money or resources. Such a body also forms the natural organisational focus for oversight of the departmental planning process, including the programme of reviews of selected policies. It can discuss the resultant reports and agree the action to be taken to implement them.

Personnel management

I referred above to the crucial importance of the personnel management component of the total management task. Despite this, it might be thought that my emphasis on policies, resources and priorities indicates a mechanistic approach to the task of managing a department. Let me end by correcting any such impression. I fully recognise that efficiency and effectiveness are heavily dependent upon the involvement and proper motivation of managers and staff. One of the most important functions falling to the permanent head is to ensure that his department has personnel policies and practices which encourage all staff to contribute to its overall aims and priorities, and which facilitate good industrial relations.

Equal Opportunities for Women

The Rt Hon. Baroness Young

This is the edited text of a speech to the YWCA on 15 July 1982 by the Lord Privy Seal, Minister in charge of the Management and Personnel Office.

Although my political life has taken me into many areas of education, management and work – in local and central government – I have always taken a personal interest in improving employment opportunities for women. As a Minister one must be selective but this is, in my view, an area of crucial importance; not simply because individual women have as much right to fulfil their aspirations and potential at work as men, but also because if we fail to make that right good, we shall be squandering half our human resources.

This Government is firmly committed to a policy of equal opportunity for women, and recognises the important contribution which women make to the economy. It makes sense to make the best use of the talents of all. This is not to seek to prescribe what women should or should not do. We respect individual choice – either to work at home bringing up the family or to work in paid employment or, more likely, to do both.

©Crown Copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 260–267

Women to-day

Today about ten million women are – in the jargon – 'economically active' (I must say I consider this an unhappy term but the correct one to use when women are paid for the work they do!) – that is 40 per cent of the labour force. Being married seems to have little effect on whether women work or not; women today work because they want to, and often have to in order to support their families. For example, over ¾ million women are single parents bringing up children. Women increasingly choose to combine family responsibilities with a job, and half of all working-age women with dependent children are economically active. A quarter of the women with children under five also have paid work.

Legislation has kept up with these changes. Not long ago it was quite acceptable to pay women less, even if they were doing the same work as men. Now there are the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts. Nonetheless, women do not always have equal opportunities in practice. In April 1981, women's average earnings were only three-quarters of those of men. And despite many individual achievements, most women remain concentrated in a limited range of jobs. They tend to restrict or be restricted in their choice of occupation, and work mostly in education, welfare and health, clerical work, retailing, catering and hairdressing. Even highly qualified women tend to be biased toward public sector employment and under-represented in industry and commerce – particularly in those occupations requiring a high technical and scientific background.

How change may come

This pattern will not change over night. And most of the pressure for change must come from women themselves. Women coming into the labour market now have a much wider range of opportunities open to them. But they must explore all possibilities with an open mind and not just go for the so-called women's jobs. They must look ahead in seeking which career to follow rather than going for the short-term easy break. They must take up the opportunities offered by new technology, industry and government.

But it is not only up to the women themselves. There are three areas in which I would like to see some progress. These are:

(1) By encouraging more women to enter politics and public life and so to influence society;

(2) By education, particularly by building up girls' and women's skills and confidence so that they can break into occupations traditionally regarded as male: the new micro-electronic technology is an obvious example;

(3) By encouraging positive adaption of training and personnel procedures by employers so that women are given an opportunity to get to the top of their merits.

Women in politics

Let me turn first to women in politics. As you know, the last election led to Europe's first woman Prime Minister. Yet, sadly, the fewest number of women MPs since 1951 were returned with her to the House of Commons. There are now only 21 women members out of 635 – about three per cent.

Interestingly, in the European Parliament, 13 per cent of Members from this country are women. More women are elected to the European Parliament from Member States than to their own National Parliaments and the total of women Members is 17 per cent.

It is encouraging that in Local Government approximately 30 per cent of Councillors are women. Nor is there any evidence overall that women are not interested in politics. Quite the contrary, more women record their vote than men!

What can be done to get more women in the House of Commons? The best advice for Selection Committees is:

- Never turn a woman down – at least until you have seen her; and
- Ask the same questions that you would ask of men.

Education

Education is very important, for it is in school that many of our attitudes and expectations are formed and reinforced.

I would strongly urge that in secondary schools all girls should try to keep some balance of subjects. In particular, girls should be made aware of the importance of science and technical subjects and not drop them, and so run the risk of closing off some career options. But we have some way to go: last year one quarter of girls taking 'O' levels took one science subject as compared to one-third of boys; and at 'A' level two-thirds of male candidates took a science subject whilst only one-third of females chose a science option. We are making some ground and many more girls are now studying science subjects. Last year's admittance to university in the hard sciences consisted of over two-thirds men and just under one-third women.

Training

There is considerable scope for more specialised training of women at work. Acquiring qualifications is vital, but as well, there is a need for courses which help women to realise their own potential and give them confidence in their own abilities. The YWCA has been a pioneer in this, in your 'Girls at Work' courses, in your 'In-Company' courses for junior grade staff and in your 'return-to-work' courses. A number of firms are also incorporating single-sex training into their management development programmes, often opening them to men, who thereby gain an insight into the kind of difficulties encountered by women. The Manpower Services

Commission's 'Wider Opportunities for Women' courses are also a helpful development.

Personnel management

Despite training, women will still not find equal opportunities to rise to the top unless employers also adapt personnel policies and practices to women's needs as well as men's. I am thinking particularly of the assumption that the normal family has two parents, one of whom is the principal breadwinner with an uninterrupted career to offer his employer. This assumption underlies almost every aspect of the average employer's personnel system: pay, promotion criteria, appraisal of performance and potential, training needs, working hours and pensions. And women, who are assumed not to be offering a sustained career at work find their abilities discounted and their promotion prospects lessened as a result.

I therefore welcome initiatives such as that by a major clearing bank which, realising it stood to lose some of its potential managers when they had their families, introduced a scheme to keep them in touch and prepare them for a return to their career. The selected women return for a few weeks each year and receive training until they are ready to return full time. Two of the 'big five' banks have established women's career planning advisers. A high street food chain has gone for positive action to increase its proportion of women managers. Other large companies and organisations have set up committees to carry out research into the question of women's opportunities.

But in times of economic difficulty, there is a tendency for all of us to batten down the hatches against innovation and short-term calls on our resources, however beneficial they may be in the long-term. So a strong commitment to equal opportunities is needed from the top. As Minister with responsibilities for the Civil Service, I want to ensure that our women employees are given every opportunity to succeed on their merits.

Equal opportunities in the Civil Service

Past progress—The Civil Service was a pioneer of women from the beginning. It first opened its doors to women clerks in 1871; by the end of the century there were women Inspectors of Schools and Factories; administrative and executive competitions were open to women from 1927 and 1928. By 1939 a quarter of the Civil Service – then including the Post Office – were women. The Marriage Bar, under which women had to resign on marriage, was abolished in 1946. Equal pay came in 1962. A decade ago the Kemp Jones report tackled indirect discrimination and changed various rules and procedures. From 1974 women resigning and applying for reinstatement no longer had to come back at a lower grade. And the introduction of flexible working hours has made it much easier for men and women to combine career and domestic responsibility.

But the facts now are that although almost half the non-industrial civil servants are women, over 80 per cent are in clerical and equivalent grades. Only 4 per cent are at the higher levels of Assistant Secretary and above. Nearly half our executive and administrative recruits are women but after the first few years progress seems to slow down. The latest research shows that women from Clerical Officer to Principal are only about two-thirds as likely to be promoted as men with similar service. One must therefore ask has the Service failed to honour its past traditions and the ideas and spirit of equal opportunity? Have women not pressed forward themselves? Has management taken too narrow a view of its own legal obligations? And more surprisingly, has it taken too narrow a view of its interest in getting a good return on the investment in half its staff? Has the combination of Government and employer become more of a constraint? Does the Civil Service organisational climate encourage passivity rather than initiative?

In 1980 management and unions set up a Joint Review Group to make further progress. Their report this autumn will recommend a significant additional impetus. But many of the problems are already known, and we are taking some initiatives to tackle them.

Training—On training, the Civil Service College has introduced a Service-wide course for developing skills for women in middle management as allowed under the Sex Discrimination Act. Viewed at first with caution, it has been a signal success. It has helped participants to acquire management skills including self-confidence, greater awareness of objectives and decision taking. I expect courses like these to become a standing feature, and I shall invite departments to consider similar courses. Next year the College is running a pilot course for men and women managers to increase their personal effectiveness in managing staff of the opposite sex. These new courses are an important supplement but they do not substitute for more formal and specialised training.

It is still not clear, however, that every effort is made to ensure that women attend traditional training. We shall be asking managers to reconsider whether, for example, too many courses are residential and so more difficult for women with families to attend.

Besides the training of women, should we also be training all managers and personnel staff in how to bring about equal opportunities? There is a need to look carefully at career management, posting, selection and interviewing, and staff and job appraisals. It is just as important to educate male managers to expect equal performance and potential from women as it is to encourage women to show that they can achieve this. We are looking for give and take. I expect the Civil Service Joint Review Group to make recommendations on this front.

Recruitment—On recruitment there has been some progress in removing age bars – that is the age limits above which applications for jobs are refused. For example, for a variety of reasons over the years, some of the specialist grades like scientists or engineers and so on had age limits of 26 or 30 for initial recruitment. These are being swept away to avoid the criticism (voiced by the Equal Opportunities Commission) that age bars may be a subtle, unintended form of discrimination because of the different cycles of women's economic activity. If, after a successful university career, a woman has young children and chooses to get them into school before applying to the Civil Service, she may well by then be too old. The training grades are also being looked at with a view to relaxing wherever possible, or indeed abolishing, the few remaining age bars.

Other issues—But there are of course other questions:

- Should it not be policy to discourage female as well as male staff from resigning if their performance is satisfactory? In that case should there not be investment equally, though not necessarily in an identical way, in the personnel and career management both of our men and women? Should we ask whether our excellent policy of using natural wastage wherever possible to further the objective of achieving a slimmer and more efficient Civil Service encourages an assumption that women can be wasted? They make up the bulk of all the grades affected by those changes after all, and in 1980, for example, the rate of voluntary wastage for women was nearly three times that for men. A policy of equal retention at work if positively practised could provide the spur for managers at all levels to seek to use and develop their staff to the full and to offer continuity of career by the use of special leave without pay, temporary and part-time work and more liberal reinstatement arrangements.

- Then there is the question of part-time work. It is interesting that 17 per cent of employees in the UK are part-time but only three per cent of our civil servants are. One of the Review Group's early conclusions is that more should be done. But they were careful not to recommend that women should work part-time permanently, for in that case they could continue to be presumed to be non-promotable and therefore wastable material. As the discretion to provide part-time work lies with managers in departments, they have been invited to assist in this policy, and a number are making strides. The Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS), for example, has found that their part-timers are concentrated in the typing and the professional grades. It is considering proposals for greater use of part-timers which could be cost effective in local

offices and specialist areas such as computer programming and audit. There may also be scope in headquarters policy areas. In the Department of Education and Science (DES) some Principals are meeting their family commitments by working a slightly shorter working week and supplementing this with special leave without pay. In the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) two others work part-time but at home, and there are also two HEOs who job-share, working two and a half days a week each. There have been part-time Assistant Secretaries and a male part-time Chief Scientist. There are part-time women Actuaries in the Government Actuary's Department (GAD). The Inland Revenue (IR) allow part-time work for temporary periods of up to a few months to get over domestic problems. If part-timers operate successfully and to management's benefit in such various situations then surely this should be more generally true?

- When women, or men, leave the Civil Service to have families or look after elderly relatives, a lot of training and experience can be lost. Should we not seek to bring them back as soon as they choose to come, so as to use their talents and experience at progressively higher levels? Let us interview staff well before they finally decide to leave for domestic reasons, to ensure they are fully aware of the possibilities. I should like us to keep in touch with those who might do work at home, return to help out in peak or holiday times, or to do project work or to work regularly once again. When they do return do we not need to ensure careful career management so they can rebuild on the foundations that they already have?
- I should like to see more local initiatives and administrative support for the Civil Service child day care facilities available. These have been pioneered in Office of Population Censuses and Surveys (OPCS), Titchfield and DHSS Newcastle Central Office. The young, under-five, children of staff have been successfully placed in private day foster homes, and their employees' school children enjoy holiday schemes. But it is questionable whether we are meeting the potential demand. For these schemes can help parents combine family and career at virtually nil cost to the taxpayer.

Future progress—I am pleased to know departments are identifying and researching problems and seeking to change the work climate. DHSS top management are greatly concerned by the small number of women breaking into their higher grades. Their first analyses suggest that the main reasons for this are the higher wastage rates at all ages, particularly in the 25 to 29 age range; which means fewer women satisfy the time in each grade required for promotion. Secondly, there is a greater readiness of

women to decline opportunities for promotion. Thirdly, they have found that fewer women are marked as fitted for promotion by their line managers in their annual reports. Those who reach the centralised promotion interviews fare better. The Treasury top management are now considering the results of their review of domestic management policies to ensure that women can pursue their careers and gain a maximum advancement, despite competing claims from family responsibilities. The MPO is now to undertake a similar review and make recommendations on what we can do.

I am sure that the determination is to be found among Civil Service managers and women to achieve equal opportunity. A more flexible and participative management style will benefit men and women in handling their careers and families. There is now a clearer appreciation in us all to set a new standard in equal opportunities.

Policy Management: Some Reflections on a Pilgrimage

K R Batterham

Ken Batterham is a Senior Executive Officer in the Policy and Projects Section of the Capital Territory Health Commission, Canberra, Australia. At the time of writing this article he was on secondment to the Department of Health and Social Security in London under the Australian Government's Interchange Programme.

It was not so very long ago that in Australia the teaching of the theory of public administration was largely based on experience from outside Australia – largely from Britain. It is not surprising therefore that people entering the Public Service in Australia at that time, like myself, looked upon the English Civil Service as something of a parent figure among all public administrations. This may now have changed. With a good deal more indigenous experience to provide the backbone for the theory of public administration and the influences of other styles of administration playing a greater role in the development of styles of administration in Australia, Australian public servants may not now feel that the Australian system of public administration is so closely akin to that of the British Civil Service. Certainly, the similarities in the processes of government have remained sufficiently strong to ensure that the gap in administrative style is not so wide that the two styles cannot be recognised as having come from the one mould.

©Crown copyright 1982
Management in Government 1982 (4) 268 – 274

For my part old allegiance dies hard. I am therefore delighted to have the opportunity of working in the DHSS for a period of nine months during 1982. I have been seconded to the Regional Liaison Division of the Department under the Australian Government's Interchange Programme. Under this programme public servants working for the Federal Government are given the opportunity to work in government or private enterprise for a short period to allow them to gain a different perspective on the area of work in which they are engaged so that they may apply their broadened knowledge to the problems of public administration in the Australian Federal context. My area of particular interest is that of policy development and co-ordination. This is the area in which I have worked for the major part of my career in a number of different government departments.

Given this background it is not surprising that I view this sojourn as something of a pilgrimage. I hope that I will be forgiven therefore for using this analogy to draw together the somewhat disjointed themes which have come to me, as though they were mileposts along the journey.

What is policy all about?

The first major milepost was an attempt to come to grips with the problem of what policy is. I suppose that I arrived in England with the somewhat fond notion that at the end of my secondment I would have a neatly packaged idea of what policy is and how it works. That package could then be taken out of the rather abstract world of my secondment and in some way applied upon my return home in the real world of the statutory authority for which I work, the Capital Territory Health Commission, and in the wider spectrum of Federal public administration to bring about more effective policy management. The naivity of this view became apparent early. There are a wide variety of views about what policy is and how it works. Perhaps, even, each person who works with policy has a distinct view on what it is and how it works and perhaps their own theory about how it should work, as well. This is not a bad thing for at least it demonstrates that the issue of policy management is a live one and one to which numbers of people both within and outside the service are applying themselves.

I note, however, that among all the attempts to define policy one theme is common. That is, that policy is a process – a process of arriving at a course of action among a number of possible options. There is also a clear view that the process itself is problematical. First, persons working with a particular policy may not be aware of all the possible courses of action which are available to them, and hence the process of selecting the optimum course of action which will bring about a result closest to that desired is limited. Secondly, even where a number of possible courses of

action are available – and this I think is rare – we really have little idea of what the outcome of a particular course of action will be. To some extent at least we merely hope that the outcome approximates to the aim we had in view. Sometimes we are quite surprised to find that an objective we originally had in mind is actually matched by the outcome of a particular policy decision. On another level, when one course of action is selected which it is hoped will produce the desired result, we have very little knowledge of the ramifications of that course of action in other spheres.

We are, I think, still a long way from any sense of rational policy-making in which we can confidently predict that we will always select the optimum course of action and that the precise outcome of that choice will always be known.

How is policy made?

I do not wish at this milepost to enter, in a detailed way, the discussion of the theoretical background to policy decision-making which has gone on for many years. Perhaps it is useful to note the existence of the two major views about decision-making. These are the rational view which I alluded to earlier and the incremental view. Simply put, the first assumes that decisions are made with full knowledge of all options and all consequences, the second proposes that decisions are taken as a slight advance on the situation as it already exists. I hope that these statements are not too much of a travesty. However, for my part I feel that neither view represents the way in which policy makers make decisions in the real world. I believe that there is little constancy about the process of making policy decisions and that decisions are taken on the basis of the unique set of circumstances which apply to each situation. At times these circumstances may be quite close to the rational model, at times closer to the incremental view, while at times neither or both views may be seen to be at work.

In the real world, however, policy works at a number of levels. Most obviously there is a macro level at which policy is made and co-ordinated, and that is at the level of central government. Certain major policy themes run throughout the system of central government within this country. These themes are very similar to the major policy themes of the Australian Federal Government and this is not surprising as both are of a similar political philosophy. It is fundamental that a government's political philosophy will be fairly clearly reflected in most of the major areas of policy because it is from these policies that the government's actions will flow.

Not so clearly recognisable is policy at the micro level. The best example of policy at work at this level is that occurring within government departments. It is the intermeshing of the workings of policy at the macro

level of the government and at the micro level of government departments which is probably one of the most complex areas of government administration today. There are, of course, a number of other levels at which policy development is occurring and which must in the final analysis mesh into the total pattern of policy development within the country. Within this country the actions of local government must be considered. In Australia local government does not have the same strength as it does in Britain but the decisions taken at the State level are crucial and hence, if policy at the national level is to be successful, it must take into account the attitude and actions of the States.

To return, however, to the issue of policy-making at the level of government and at the level of government departments. A number of commentators on the issue of policy-making have rightly stated that it is for the Minister to make the policy for the area covered by his own portfolio. This must always be the case if the concept of ministerial responsibility is to be preserved. However some commentators then go on to say, when discussing the role of the Civil Service in policy-making, that its role is restricted to providing policy initiatives where gaps exist in government policy-making and to providing continuity between governments. This is, of course, far too narrow a view of the role of the government department. Policy-making does not exist in a vacuum; it is part of the total process of government. There is no situation where I can imagine a policy vacuum existing to be filled by something which civil servants contrive. The existence of a situation where the government has not enunciated a policy may yet clearly indicate the government's policy on that situation.

The making of policy is a continuing dynamic process in which information constantly flows between the government and its department (and of course between the government and the electorate). It is this dynamic process which produces policy. Under these circumstances it is unlikely that any policy will remain static.

Effective policy at the macro and the micro level requires co-ordination and it is this issue which I wish to discuss at the final milepost.

Policy management

I had another naive notion before I arrived here, and that was that I would find the best of all possible systems of policy co-ordination in action throughout the Civil Service. It did not take long for me to be disillusioned in this matter as well. There are, however, a couple of points which ought to be made about policy co-ordination generally at the national government level and specifically at the departmental level in Britain.

It seems to me to be a universal characteristic of policy co-ordination at the departmental level that units which have been set up to co-ordinate

policy at that level, in recognition of the greatly increased flow of policy information, have had only limited success. Often they make some limited attempts to come to grips with the management of policy and, finding that a task with which they cannot possibly cope, their activities degenerate into either a firefighting role (dealing with problems which are too difficult for others to handle) or they become units which themselves specialise in producing policy, perhaps of a more global nature than that produced at the functional unit level. Their task in co-ordination is not made any easier by the fact that they often meet resistance at the functional unit level.

It is interesting to note that these policy units have largely been established in the past five to seven years, which has been the period of greatest increase in information flowing to ministers. It seems legitimate that special units should have been established to cope with the bringing together of information about what is happening in government departments. Without effective management in this area there is a real danger that communication between the department and the minister will suffer if not break down altogether. Given this, and the fact that central co-ordination is in the interests of functional units, it is difficult to understand why there should be resistance to policy co-ordination within departments.

Having said this I should also add that there are some very good examples of effective co-ordination going on in both the Civil Service and in Australia. One of the best examples of this is the Regional Review programme which the Regional Liaison Division of DHSS is co-ordinating at present. What is occurring is that the Chairmen of each of the fourteen National Health Service Regions are coming together with their teams of officers for individual structured discussions with ministers. The discussions take the form of an analysis of a small number of particular issues and the agreeing of objectives between ministers and the Regions for progress in the selected areas. I realise that this process has not been established specifically as a policy co-ordination exercise, but because of the detailed preparation which must be undertaken for a meeting such as this almost every issue which is alive in a region must be canvassed and discussed thoroughly between the Region and the department. The programme is an ongoing one. It will occur only once each year but I doubt that thorough policy co-ordination can occur more regularly than this. The process has the particular advantage of direct ministerial involvement.

In some departments there are examples of direct policy co-ordination which are working. Usually these take the form of an analysis of objectives of management units and of work programmes in hand. The most successful of these emphasise the benefits to functional managers of having a thorough analysis of the activities of the functional units particularly in the area of manpower distribution. At times of generally tight

restrictions on manpower and generally greater demands for output, it is very useful for managers to know where the greatest pressure is occurring in their area of administration – particularly if the analysis is done by an impartial unit which can look at these problems objectively.

These examples are not of course intended to be exhaustive. There are, I understand, some good examples of cross sector co-ordination occurring in the DHSS, as I am sure there are in other departments as well.

It seems that little has been attempted in a formal sense in the sphere of policy-auditing. Given the generally limited manpower resources available to policy units, it appears to me that some type of policy audit, in which senior management staff are asked specifically to account for what their functional units are doing in a policy sense, may be an effective means of managing policy. In Australia there is a greater impetus for some formal system of policy-auditing as virtually all departments have a statutory requirement to report to their ministers annually. These reports currently take the form of brief statements by each functional unit of newsworthy happenings during the year. They very rarely attempt to account publicly for the direction which the department is taking. By undertaking a specific programme of policy-auditing, policy units could provide the backbone of effective information for inclusion in annual reports.

At the Government level, co-ordination of policy is infinitely more complex. Again there appears to be a movement away from specific co-ordination by bodies whose original charter included some responsibility in this area. Many now seem to be involved rather in specific project work, particularly where the area of study falls within the responsibility of more than one department, or again problem-solving in areas which are considered more complex, or putting forward an alternative course of action in response to programmes proposed by departments. I am not saying that any of these activities are not to be encouraged. They are all essential ingredients of effective administration. However, there is a sense in which effective policy co-ordination from the centre is essential if duplication and gaps in services are to be avoided – which is surely most needed at times of economic restraint. I do not believe that the reason for the withdrawal from co-ordination lies entirely in the non-interventionist climate which is the current experience. The co-ordination of policy at a national level is a complex area and one which deserves a great deal more study.

Conclusion

I do not think that a pilgrimage has a conclusion. Certainly not during its course. Perhaps a conclusion will have to wait for my return whence I came. I should observe, though, that if one studies the spiritual pilgrimages which are recorded in literature, it is not so much the journey itself which is

important but the people with whom the pilgrim shares his experiences. This may take the form of a simple meal or a complex philosophical discussion.Indeed, while I would not necessarily consider my sojourn in England on a par with those recorded by the pilgrims it is interesting to note that most of the learning which has occurred for me during this time has taken precisely the same form as that of the pilgrims. I would therefore simply like to record my thanks to those who have given me their time and helped shape my ideas and questions on the perplexing issue of policy.

Civil Service College Courses and Seminars

The Civil Service College runs a wide range of courses and seminars, many of which are open to both civil servants and people outside government. A small selection of the courses due to be held between February and April 1983 is shown below together with a contact point for further information. The College's complete programme for the 1982–83 academic year can be obtained from the Library – Telephone: Ascot (0990) 23444 ext. 263.

Course Title	*Dates*
Programming in BASIC for non-ADP staff	25–27 April 1983
Effective consultancy	24 January– 4 February 1983 7–18 March 1983
Investigation, analysis and principles of design	7–18 February 1983 7–18 March 1983 11–22 April 1983
Practice of organisation and methods	21–25 March 1983 25–29 April 1983

Contact Mr David Williams, Civil Service College,
11 Belgrave Road, London SW1V 1RB
Telephone: 01-834 6644 ext. 384 or GTN 2803 384

Statistical methods for the administrator	20–22 April 1983
Planning methods and their data needs	18–20 April 1983
Decision analysis: theory and practice	7–10 March 1983
Operational research	25–29 April 1983

Contact Mrs Somerville, Civil Service College
Sunningdale Park, Ascot, Berks SL5 0QE
Telephone: Ascot (0990) 23444 ext. 278 or GTN 2092 278

Managing cutbacks	31 January– 2 February 1983
Government and nationalised industries	7–11 February 1983
How central government works	14–25 March 1983
How policy is made in Britain	25–29 April 1983

Contact Mrs Murial Ward, Civil Service College
Sunningdale Park,
Ascot, Berks SL5 0QE
Telephone: Ascot (0990) 23444 ext. 295 or GTN 2092 295

Financial planning and control	14–18 February 1983
Departmental audit management	25–29 April 1983
Finance course for senior administrators: developments in financial management in government	7–9 March 1983
Government financial organisation	28 February– 3 March 1983

Contact Mr Rick Griffiths, Civil Service College
11 Belgrave Road,
London SW1V 1RB
Telephone: 01-834 6644 ext. 523 or GTN 2803 523

Improving team effectiveness	14–18 February 1983
Introduction to industrial relations for senior staff	14–16 February 1983
Introduction to management for senior staff	21–25 March 1983
The government as employer	25–29 April 1983

Contact Mrs Andrea Stancliffe, Civil Service College,
Sunningdale Park,
Ascot, Berks SL5 0QE
Telephone: Ascot (0990) 23444 ext. 341 or GTN 2092 341

New Publications on the Civil Service

This is a list of the documents recently issued by the Management and Personnel Office on management in the Civil Service. These items may be examined in the *Central Management Library, Management and Personnel Office, Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2AZ,* and copies may be ordered from the same address. HMSO publications may be ordered from *PO Box 569, London SE1 9NH,* from Government Bookshops, or through any bookseller.

Civil service pay: a bibliography
1982; 200 refs; gratis

Code of practice for the use of management consultants by government departments
HMSO; 4th ed 1982; 15 pages; £2.50
ISBN 0 11 630460 X

Efficiency and Effectiveness in the Civil Service: Government Observations on the Third Report from the Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Session 1981 – 82, HC 236 (Cmnd. 8616)
HMSO; 35 pages; £3.40
ISBN 0 10 186160 5

Interchange of staff between the Home Civil Service and Industry and Commerce: Report for 1981
1982; 8 pages; gratis

Luxembourg briefing
1982; 14 pages; gratis
ISBN 0 7115 0045 2

Messenger's Pocket Book
3rd ed 1982; 25 pages; gratis

Public access to government information: a bibliography
1982; 285 refs; gratis

A student's guide to day release for civil servants under 18: England and Wales
1982; 22 pages; gratis

Civil Service College

Programme of courses: September 1982 to August 1983
1982; 408 pages; gratis

The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: a Negotiating Exercise by M Hyder and H Wallace
1982; 135 pages; £2.75
ISBN 0 7115 0050 9

Civil Service Commission

Appointments in Administration 1983
1982; 32 pages; gratis

Civil Service Careers 1983: Degree level
1982; 24 pages; gratis

Civil Service Careers 1983: GCE/SCE level
1982; 16 pages; gratis

Civil Service Council for Further Education

Report 1980/81 to the National Whitley Council
1982; 13 pages; gratis

Index for 1982

Management in Government Volume 37 – 1982

Page

Abstracts
- Abstracts 62
- Abstracts 132

Accountancy and audit
- Economic and Financial Factors Affecting Public Expenditure 224
- Have You a Computer to Declare? The Audit by HM Customs & Excise of Commercial Computer Systems 113
- Management Accounting in the Manpower Services Commission 4
- Management Audit in the Ministry of Defence 138
- A Wider Role for Accountants 83

Assaults on staff
- At the Sharp End 92

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ministry of
- The Fisherman's Honest Broker 177
- Foot and Mouth Disease: How the Spread was Stopped 51

Cash limits
- Economic and Financial Factors Affecting Public Expenditure 224

Channel
- The Channel Navigation Information Service 54

Civil Service College
- Civil Service College Courses and Seminars 202
- Civil Service College Courses and Seminars 275
- Systems Training in the Civil Service College 34

Civil Service
- The Establishment Officers' Meeting: A Time Exposure 98
- Public Service Management – An Elusive Concept? 154
- Some Reflections on Change 71

Computers
- Appraising the Work of Office Technology Systems 163
- Computer Installations for Government Departments 64
- Have You a Computer to Declare? The Audit by HM Customs & Excise of Commercial Computer Systems 113

Customs & Excise
- Have You a Computer to Declare? The Audit by HM Customs & Excise of Commercial Computer Systems 113

Defence, Ministry of
- Furnishing Economies – Bridging the Gap between Concept and Implementation 196
- Management Audit in the Ministry of Defence 138

	Page
Disabled people	
The International Year of Disabled People: A New Perspective for One Government Department	18
Economy	
Furnishing Economies – Bridging the Gap between Concept and Implementation	196
Economics	
Economic and Financial Factors Affecting Public Expenditure	224
Equal opportunities	
Equal Opportunities for Women	260
Establishment Officers	
The Establishment Officers' Meeting: A Time Exposure	98
Financial institutions	
Urban Renewal: The Financial Institutions and Whitehall	206
Fisheries Inspector	
The Fisherman's Honest Broker	177
Foot and mouth disease	
Foot and Mouth Disease: How the Spread was Stopped	51
Forms	
Government Forms	107
The Language and Design of Effective Forms	147
Government	
Machinery of Government Changes in 1981	126
Health & Social Security, Department of –	
At the Sharp End	92
A Farewell to Alms: Reflections on a Year as a Manager of a DHSS Local Office	24
Information	
Information and the Challenge of Information Technology	188
Investment appraisal	
Appraising the Worth of Office Technology Systems	163
Machinery of Government	
Machinery of Government Changes in 1981	126
Management	
The Establishment Officers' Meeting: A Time Exposure	98
A Farewell to Alms: Reflections of a Year as a Manager of a DHSS Local Office	24
Management Accounting in the Manpower Services Commission	4
Management Guidelines	219
Managing a Government Department	251
A New Printing Works for Hansard	233
Policy Management: Some Reflections on a Pilgrimage	268
Public Service management – An Elusive Concept?	154
Some Reflections on Change	71
Urban Renewal: The Financial Institutions and Whitehall	206

	Page
Management consultants	
Management Consultants in Government	131
Management services	
Furnishing Economies – Bridging the Gap between Concept and Implementation	196
Manpower Services Commission	
Management Accounting in the Manpower Services Commission	4
Navigation	
The Channel Navigation Information Service	54
Office technology	
Appraising the Worth of Office Technology Systems	163
Personnel management	
A Wider Role for Accountants	83
Policy	
Policy Management: Some Reflections on a Pilgrimage	268
Printing	
A New Printing Works for Hansard	233
Publications	
New CSD and MPO Publications	65
New Publications on the Civil Service	135
New Publications on the Civil Service	203
New Publications on the Civil Service	276
Reviews	
The Review of R&D Support Services	241
Stationery Office, Her Majesty's	
A New Printing Works for Hansard	233
Suggestions schemes	
Improvements in Staff Suggestions Schemes	182
Support services	
The Review of R&D Support Services	241
Systems	
Systems Training in the Civil Service College	34
Technology	
Appraising the Worth of Office Technology Systems	163
Information and the Challenge of Information Technology	188
The Use of Viewdata in the Public Sector	38
Trade, Department of	
The Channel Navigation Information Service	54
Training	
Systems Training in the Civil Service College	34

Transport, Department of *Page*
The International Year of Disabled People:
A New Perspective for One Government Department 18

Treasury control
The Establishment Officers' Meeting: A Time Exposure 98

Viewdata
The Use of Viewdata in the Public Sector 34

Women
Equal Opportunities for Women 260

Printed in England for Her Majesty's Stationery Office by Adams Bros. & Shardlow Ltd., Leicester
Dd 0718251 C33 10/82

Management in Government

Contributions and correspondence are welcomed; they should be addressed to the editor at the Management and Personnel Office, Old Admiralty Building, Whitehall, London SW1A 2AZ. Manuscripts should preferably be clearly typed on single sides of A4 paper with double spacing and wide margins. Photographs should be in black and white with a glossy finish and free from creases and marks. Civil Service contributors should first obtain the approval of their departments for publication.

Abstracts of technical articles and reports by civil servants should include:

(1) Title or subject
(2) Author
(3) Synopsis (not more than 140 words)
(4) Address from which copies of article or report can be obtained.

Enquiries about subscriptions, sales and copyright should be addressed to Her Majesty's Stationery Office, PO Box 569, London SE1 9NH or any of the bookshops listed overleaf.

BACKFILE VOLUMES: Complete volumes of Management Services in Government are available on microfilm from University Microfilms International, 300 North Zaeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, USA.

HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE
PO Box 569, London SE1 9NH
Government Bookshops
49 High Holborn, London WC1V 6HB
13a Castle Street, Edinburgh EH2 3AR
41 The Hayes, Cardiff CF1 1JW
Brazennose Street, Manchester M60 8AS
Southey House, Wine Street, Bristol BS1 2BQ
258 Broad Street, Birmingham B1 2HE
80 Chichester Street, Belfast BT1 4JY
Government Publications are also available through booksellers

£1.80 net
(Annual subscription including postage £7.72)

ISBN 0 11 726746 5
ISSN 0263-4678

C15